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INTRODUCTION
The STS-71 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities
and provides detailed data on the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine
(SSME) systems performance. STS-71 is the 100th United States manned space flight,
the sixty-ninth Space Shuttle flight, the forty-fourth flight since the return-to-flight, the
fourteenth flight of the OV-104 Orbiter vehicle Atlantis, and the first joint United States
(U.S.)-Russian docking mission since 1975. In addition to the OV-104 Orbiter vehicle,
the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated ET-70; three SSMEs that
were designated 2028, 2034, and 2032 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two
SRBs that were designated BI-072. The RSRMs that were an integral part of the SRBs
were designated 360L045A for the left SRB and 360W045B for the right SRB.
The STS-71 mission was planned as a 10-day plus 1-day-extension mission plus
2 additional days for contingency operations and weather avoidance. The primary
objectives of this flight were to rendezvous and dock with the Mir Space Station and
perform on-orbit joint U.S.-Russian life sciences investigations, logistical resupply of
the Mir Space Station, return of the United States astronaut flying on the Mir, the
replacement of the Mir-18 crew with the two-cosmonaut Mir-19 crew, and the return of
the Mir-18 crew to Earth. The secondary objectives were to perform the requirements
of the IMAX Camera and the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II).
The STS-71 Space Shuttle Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program
requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. The
requirement states that each major organizational element supporting the Program will
report the results of their hardware (and software) evaluation and mission performance,
plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The STS-71 sequence of events is shown in Table I, the Orbiter Problem Tracking List
is shown in Table II, the Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)/Flight Crew
Equipment (FCE) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table III, and the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table IV. In addition, the
Shuttle Payload and Integration in-flight anomalies are referenced in applicable
sections of the Report. Appendix A lists the sources of data, and Appendix B provides
the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used in the document. All times from liftoff
through landing are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time
(MET).
The five-person STS-71 launch crew consisted of Robert L. "Hoot" Gibson, Capt., U. S.
Navy, Commander; Charles J. Precourt, Lt. Col., U. S. Air Force, Pilot; Ellen S. Baker,
M. D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 1; Gregory J. Harbaugh, Civilian, Mission Specialist
2; and Bonnie Dunbar, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 3. STS-71 was the fifth space
flight for the Commander, the fourth space flight for Mission Specialist 3, the third
space flight for Mission Specialists 1 and 2, and the second space flight for the Pilot.
In addition to the five-person U. S. crew, two Russian cosmonauts were taken to the
Mir Space Station. These two cosmonauts, who relieved the present Mir-18 crew, were
Anatoly Y. Solovyev, Mir-19 Commander, and Nikolai M. Budarin, Mir-19 Flight
Engineer. The STS-71/Mir-19 flight was the fourth space flight for the Mir-19
Commander, and the first space flight for the Mir-19 Flight Engineer.
The Mir-18 crew of two Russian cosmonauts and one U. S. astronaut was returned to
Earth from the Mir Space Station. The crew members were Vladimir N. Dezhurov, Lt.
Col., Russian Air Force, Mir-18 Commander; Gennady M. Strekalov, Civilian, Mir-18
Flight Engineer; and Norman E. Thagard, M. D., Civilian, Mir-18 Cosmonaut
Researcher. The Mir-18/STS-71 flight was the first space flight for the Mir-18
Commander, the fourth space flight for the Mir-18 Flight Engineer, and the fifth space
flight for the Mir-18 Cosmonaut Researcher. On March 14, 1995, the Mir-18
Cosmonaut Researcher became the first U. S. astronaut to be launched into earth orbit
on a Russian launch vehicle. The Mir-18 crew was also the first crew to be returned to
Earth in a vehicle other than the one that took them to orbit.
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MISSION SUMMARY
The STS-71 launch that was planned for June 23, 1995, was scrubbed at
approximately 9:45 a.m.e.d.t, because ET propellant loading could not be performed
due to lightning in the area.
The second attempt to launch STS-71 on June 24, 1995, was also scrubbed near the
end of the T-9 minute hold because of unacceptable weather conditions that were not
predicted to clear during the launch window. A three-day stand-down was instituted
because of the forecast of continued unfavorable launch weather. During the stand-
down, the power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem cryogenics were
replenished.
During the launch countdown on June 27,1995, a small leak of approximately 0.2 Ib/hr
was present from the PRSD subsystem oxygen tank 1. This leak continued throughout
the mission with no impact to the planned activities. Postflight troubleshooting revealed
a leak in the tank 1 fill quick disconnect (QD) poppet.
The vehicle was launched at 178:19:32:18.988 G.m.t. (3:32:19 p.m.e.d.t.) on June 27,
1995, from launch complex 39A. The orbital inclination was 51.6 degrees. The ascent
phase was nominal, and no orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 1 maneuver was
required because of the satisfactory ascent trajectory. The OMS 2 maneuver was
performed at 178:20:15:16.8 G.m.t. (00:00:42:57.8 MET). The maneuver was 47.7
seconds in duration and the differential velocity (AV) was 74 ft/sec. The orbit achieved
was 160 by 85.3 nmi.
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and the launch phase
performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent performance was as
expected. SRB separation, entry, deceleration and water impact occurred as expected,
and both SRBs were recovered and returned to Kennedy Space Center for
refurbishment. Performance of the SSMEs, ET and main propulsion system (MPS) was
normal.
The postflight disassembly of the nozzle assemblies for the RSRMs revealed a nozzle
internal joint gas path and primary O-ring erosion. An investigation into the cause of
this problem was continuing as this report was being written. The findings of this
investigation will be published in a separate report.
An analysis of the vehicle propulsive performance during ascent was made using
vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the
average flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) that was determined for the time
period between SRB separation and start of 3-g throttling was a satisfactory
452.1 seconds as compared to the MPS tag value of 452.67 seconds.
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Review of ascent data indicated that the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) flow control valve
(FCV) for SSME 3 exhibited slight sluggishness during the latter portion of ascent. The
amount of sluggishness was minor and had no effect on overall GH2 system
pressurization.
Ascent data also showed that the SSME 1 liquid hydrogen (LH2) recirculation valve
closed slowly when commanded at T-10 seconds just prior to LH2 prevalve opening.
This valve isolates hydrogen in the event of a premature engine shutdown; therefore,
its slow closure posed no impact to the STS-71 ascent because no premature engine
shutdown occurred.
The payload bay door opening sequence was completed satisfactorily at
178:21:07:15 G.m.t. (00:01:34:56 MET).
At 178:23:10:25.2 G.m.t. (00:03:38:06.2 MET), an OMS 3 dual-engine straight-feed
firing was initiated to raise the orbit to 210 x 159 nmi. This firing was approximately
136.9 seconds in duration and imparted a 220.7 ft/sec AV to the vehicle. Subsystem
performance was nominal for the firing.
The single-engine OMS-4 firing was approximately 12.4 seconds in duration. The firing
was performed at 179:10:49:35.8 G.m.t. (00:15:17:16.8 MET) using the left OMS
engine. A total of 10 ft/sec AV was imparted to the vehicle, and data indicate nominal
subsystem performance.
The PRSD hydrogen manifold 1 valve failed to close when the flight day I pre-sleep
cryogenics reconfiguration was performed. Following the failure, the oxygen manifold 1
valve was opened and both manifold 2 valves were closed for all sleep periods.
Posfflight inspection revealed a broken lug in the valve command ground path that
prevented the valve from closing.
The initial preparation of the Androgynous Peripheral Docking System (APDS) was
accomplished by system power-up and guide-ring extension. The guide ring was
placed in the ready-for-docking position. APDS power-up occurred at approximately
179:15:44 G.m.t. (00:20:12 MET). The guide-ring extension occurred nominally within
the planned dual-motor drive time of approximately 2.5 minutes. All status data from
APDS were normal.
The crew found that no batteries were installed in the hand-held light distance and
ranging (LIDAR) battery packs. An in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure was
developed that enabled the LIDAR to use Orbiter power via a break-out box. The
LIDAR operated satisfactorily in this power configuration.
A dual-engine, 46-second OMS firing (NC4) was performed at 180:07:57:17.2 G.m.t.
(01:12:24:58.2 MET) and a AV of 75 ft/sec was imparted to the vehicle.
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An OMS left-engine-only terminal phase initiation (TI) maneuver was performed at
180:09:31:01.2 G.m.t. (01:13:58:42.2 MET). The 9.2-second maneuver imparted a
of 7.2 ft/sec, and the resultant orbit was 218 by 208 nmi.
AV
The Ku-band radar acquired the Mir at 132,000 ft, and lock was maintained until the
Ku-band was switched to the communications mode. The ultra-high frequency (UHF)
communications system, trajectory control sensor, hand-held LIDAR equipment, and
centerline TV all performed satisfactorily during the rendezvous and docking activity.
Shuttle-approach plume loads on the Mir were benign, since no closing-rate braking
was required. Only one significant reaction control subsystem (RCS) 0.080-second
duration thruster firing occurred. It was an aft Z-axis thruster that was aligned toward
the fully deployed Spektr module solar panel. Reconstructed structural margins were
high.
The docking mechanism was powered up nominally prior to contact. Docking contact
conditions were excellent. The closing rate was very close to the targeted 0.1 ft/sec.
Interface contact occurred with very small misalignments. The lateral misalignment
was less than one inch and the angular misalignment was less than 0.5-degree per
axis. The closing velocity was approximately 0.107 ft/sec at contact. Post-contact
thrusting (PCT) was initiated about 0.5 second before indicated capture. The capture-
latch indication occurred at approximately 180:13:00:13.9 G.m.t. (01:17:27:18.9 MET).
Since the PCT sequence was 2.4 seconds in duration, the second phase of the pulsing
occurred after capture. The axial load response peaked at approximately 1000 kgf, two
seconds after capture. The post-capture relative motion was benign. Reconstructed
docking loads were benign with axial compression loads about 60 percent of the
allowable at the Shuttle-Mir interface. Minimum load margins were 16 percent on
KrystalI-Base Module axial tension as predicted preflight, and 50 percent on Shuttle-Mir
interface bending moment. Lateral shear loads were not significant.
The relative vehicle rotation peaked at approximately 2.0 degrees about 22 seconds
after capture. All motion was damped out and the docking mechanism ring-align signal
was received within 120 seconds of capture. Dampers deactivated nominally
35 seconds after capture and the ring drive command for extension occurred
60 seconds after capture. The ring drive was stopped nominally to allow for further
damping. The ring-in command was given approximately one minute later. The ring
drive and structural hooks performed nominally, mating the two vehicles, and docking
was completed at 180:13:08:17.9 G.m.t. (01:18:35:22.9 MET). The system was
powered down nominally.
External airlock-to-vestibule and Mir-to-vestibule atmospheric leak checks were
performed with no leakage noted. At 180:13:59 G.m.t. (01:18:27 MET), vestibule and
Mir pressures were equalized to 2.24-psia lower than the external airlock pressure
(14.68 psia). The pressurization took two minutes. At 180:14:37 G.m.t.
(01:19:05 MET), the upper hatch equalization valve was opened to equalize Shuttle
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and Mir pressures. The initial Orbiter cabin pressure was 14.68 psia and equalization
was complete in 3.5 minutes with a resulting pressure of 13.20 psia.
At 181:05:08:59 G.m.t. (02:09:36:40 MET) general purpose computer (GPC) 4
(sin 536), which had been functioning as the systems management (SM) machine,
failed to sync with GPC 1 and was declared failed by GPC 1. Analysis confirmed that
the fail-to-sync was the result of a hardware event, and it was most likely caused by a
radiation upset. GPC 4 was reinitialized and the GPC operated satisfactorily for the
remainder of the mission.
The forward RCS was using more propellant than predicted while in the inertial-hold
attitude and docked with the Mir. As a result, a change to a gravity-gradient attitude
was made that resulted in a large reduction in propellant consumption. The increased
propellant usage in the inertial-hold attitude only occurred during negative pitch
maneuvers. Analysis showed that this phenomenon was caused by the effects of R5D
and L5D RCS thruster-plume impingement upon the elevons and body flap. The effect
of this phenomenon is virtually undetectable in the Orbiter-only configuration; however,
it is believed to be magnified in the Shuttle-Mir docked configuration because the
center-of-gravity (c.g.) is external to the vehicle.
A fault message occurred on PRSD hydrogen (H=) manifold 1 at 182:01:34:25 G.m.t.
(03:06:02:06 MET) indicating that the isolation valve was closed when it should be
open. The crew cycled the switch twice without effect. The valve was verified to be
open using tank and manifold pressure data. The indication toggled several times
during the flight.
At 182:08:50:30 G.m.t. (03:13:18:11 MET), a cathode ray tube (CRT) 2 built-in test
equipment (BITE) message was annunciated against display electronics unit (DEU) 2.
This error was attributed to a known =short store complete" scenario, which can occur
on -0108 or-0109 DEUs (DEU 2 SIN 29 is a -0108). Crew procedures corrected the
BITE condition.
The SM checkpoint at 182:09:10:36 G.m.t. (03:13:38:17 MET) failed with a "checkpoint
fail" and an "off/busy" message annunicated against mass memory unit (MMU) 1. The
SM checkpoint was reattempted successfully on MMU 1, and the MMU operated
satisfactorily for the remainder of the flight. The signature observed is consistent with a
known MMU power-supply problem caused by internal noise. A design modification
exists to correct this phenomena.
The primary air-to-air very high frequency (VHF) radio was unable to transmit to the
Mir. The crew switched to the backup VHF radio and two-way communications with the
Mir were restored. Troubleshooting did not regain function of the primary VHF radio.
The Risk Mitigation Experiment (RME) 1301, Mated Structural Dynamics test, was
performed. Analysis indicates nominal structural modeling.
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The Mir assumed the attitude control function for the combined vehicles at
183:10:13 G.m.t. (04:14:41 MET). Mir control was monitored via the Shuttle digital
autopilot (DAP) estimator. Mir appeared to require gyrodyne desaturation twice as
often as shown in preflight estimates, but overall Mir control was satisfactory. The
Orbiter resumed attitude control at 183:14:55 G.m.t. (04:19:23 MET). The Orbiter
elevons were parked at -7.5 ° to aid in the investigation of the higher-than-predicted
propellant usage during Orbiter-controlled inertial attitudes.
Eighteen Russian water tanks and three contingency water containers (CWCs) were
filled for use by the Mir for waste system flushing and electrolysis. A total of 1,067 Ib of
water was provided to the Mir. Also during the docked period, the Shuttle
environmental control system was used to raise the internal pressure of the Mir to
15.1 psia. In this process, a total of 48 Ib of oxygen and 87 Ib of nitrogen was provided
to the Mir. This repressurization was requested by the Russians to improve the Mir
consumable margins.
Development Test Objective (DTO) 1120, Mated Shuttle and Mir Free Drift Experiment,
was successfully performed from 184:09:30 G.m.t. to 184:13:45 G.m.t. (05:12:58 MET
to 05:18:13 MET). The attitude deviations remained below the 10-degree breakout
limit. This test was performed at the 2-degree biased gravity orientation (GO) 1.2
attitude. Over the duration of the test, the yaw-axis attitude error was growing slowly in
magnitude and approached the 10-degree limit. Following the test, the Shuttle
resumed nominal control of the mated stack.
The Mir hatch was closed at 184:19:35 G.m.t.(06:00:03 MET) and the Orbiter hatch
was closed at 184:19:48 G.m.t. (06:00:16 MET). At 184:19:59 G.m.t. (06:00:27 MET),
the vestibule depressurization began. Low flow was observed when the primary
depressurization valves were opened. After the low flow was noted, the secondary
depressurization valves were also opened, but no change in flow rate occurred;
however, completed depressurization of the vestibule was achieved prior to undocking.
The slow vestibule depressurization appeared to be due to a thermal insulation blanket
blocking the depressurization valve port.
The final preparations for undocking were performed, and the Orbiter undocking
activities were successfully completed at 185:11:09:41.8 G.m.t. (06:15:37:22.8 MET).
Data analysis indicated nominal APDS performance.
Both trajectory control sensor (TCS) units were activated at approximately
185:10:35 G.m.t. (06:15:03 MET), and the units operated satisfactorily throughout the
undocking and initial separation. The Ku-band radar tracked the Mir throughout the
undocking and separation activities to a range in excess of 50,000 feet.
DTO 1122, Androgynous Peripheral Assembly System (APAS) Thermal Data, was
performed satisfactorily. No hot-case or cold-case attitude breakouts were required as
all docking mechanism temperatures remained within the breakout criteria.
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At 186:11:57 G.m.t. (07:16:25 MET), a vernier RCS firing test was performed to help
resolve the increased propellant usage noted during docked operations. Analysis of
the results indicates that the actual unmated Orbiter negative-pitch acceleration
showed little variance from ground-calculated acceleration based on current predictions
of Orbiter mass properties. This confirms that the effect of the modeling error is unique
to the mated Shuttle/Mir configuration.
The crew reported that the Hasselblad 70mm camera (sin 1026) shutter-release button
was sticking. When the shutter release button was depressed, the camera cycled
through the remainder of the film magazine. An IFM procedure was performed in which
the shutter release button was moved from the primary receptacle to the secondary
receptacle. The IFM was successful and the camera performed nominally for the
remainder of the mission. The crew also stated that the lens had jammed, but they
were able to restore proper operation of the lens. Another Hasselblad 70mm camera
was available if the one in use had become inoperable.
Part I of the flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed at
187:10:27:32.280 G.m.t. (08:14:55:13.292 MET) using auxiliary power unit (APU) 1.
APU 1 ran for 5 minutes, 28.710 seconds and 11 pounds of fuel were used. Data
analysis shows nominal performance.
During the RCS hot-fire, RCS thruster R2U failed off due to low chamber pressure
(2.5 psia). Injector temperatures showed pilot-valve-only flow through the oxidizer
valve, and this is consistent with prior thruster failures caused by metal-nitrate
contamination. The failure was on the first firing of R2U during this mission, and the
thruster was left deselected for the rest of the flight.
During the landing-minus-l-day communications system checkout, short dropouts of
network signal processor (NSP) and communications security (COMSEC) frame
synchronizations were experienced. Troubleshooting isolated the problem to
transponder 2. The system was configured to use transponder I for the remainder of
the flight with no recurrence of the frame synchronization dropouts.
During entry preparations, the modular auxiliary data system (MADS) recorder did not
begin recording when commanded at 188:13:31 G.m.t. (09:17:59 MET). The mode
switch was found to have been placed in the neutral position and this prohibited uplink
control of the MADS.
All entry stowage and deorbit preparations were completed in preparation for entry on
the nominal end-of-mission landing day. The payload bay doors were successfully
closed and latched at 188:11:06:03 G.m.t. (09:15:34:44 MET). The deorbit maneuver
for a Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) landing was
performed at 188:13:45:19.3 G.m.t. (09:18:13:00.3 MET), and the maneuver was
213.3 seconds in duration with a AV of 373 ft/sec.
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During entry, the gearbox pressure transducer became erratic when the APU 3 gearbox
repressurization circuit was activated, and this resulted in approximately 80 percent of
the GN2 supply bottle being expelled into the gearbox. This excessive repressurization
caused gearbox pressure to rise to over 30 psi, whereas a normal repressurization
increases gearbox pressure to approximately 10 psi. The higher pressure did not affect
the operation of APU 3. Postflight troubleshooting indicated that the gearbox GN2
pressure transducer malfunctioned.
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred at KSC
on SLF concrete runway 15 at 188:14:54:36 G.m.t. (09:19:22:17 MET) on July 7, 1995.
The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at 188:14:54:38.8 G.m.t. and the nose gear
touchdown occurred 6.2 seconds later. The drag chute was jettisoned at
188:14:55:09.2 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at 188:14:55:28 G.m.t. The rollout
was normal in all respects. The flight duration was 09 days 19 hours 22 minutes and
17 seconds. The APUs were shut down 20 minutes 50 seconds after landing.
The successful completion of the STS-71 mission resulted in 100 percent of all
objectives of the mission being accomplished. These objectives included the
successful exchange of the Mir-18 and Mir-19 crews, retrieval of science data, the
science resupply of the Mir for future missions, and the completion of the joint science
activities.
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SPACE STATION IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
This first Shuttle-Mir flight provided new and valuable insights into Orbiter subsystem
issues that will affect future Shuttle-Mir and International Space Station (ISS) missions.
These new insights are discussed in the following paragraphs.
REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Marginal heater power on the RCS vernier thrusters can result in injector temperatures
below the 130 °F operational limit during extended non-active docked periods at low
beta angles. The Mir cases were evaluated, and as a result, a flight rule was instituted
to restrict vernier operation at temperatures below 130 °F based on extensive ground
data monitoring. This flight rule requires re-evaluation for ISS docked missions based
on the predicted thermal environment, ground monitoring capability, and workaround
capabilities. Engineering is assessing the validity of the 130 °F operating limit and the
90 °F non-operating limit for vernier thrusters. Additionally, a DTO is being considered
to determine how low the temperatures will actually reach in a docked attitude.
RCS vernier thruster usage was significantly higher than seen during typical missions
in the areas of total pulses, duty cycle, firing duration, and accumulated thermal cycles.
The following table reflects thruster firings until approximately 8 hours prior to entry.
VERNIER THRUSTER FIRINGS
Thruster
F5L
Firings
3530
Firing time_ sec
4789
Thermal cycles
136
F5R 4435 4987 127
L5D 2839 8157 223
L5L 2683
3078
3342
R5D
3137
8285
2972R5R
67
225
62
The number of firings falls well within the 500,000-cycle certified life; however, the firing
time on the aft down-firing thrusters was marginal for the 125,000-second certified limit
(approximately 15 missions equivalent). Additionally, a large number of long-duration
firings (> 50 seconds) occurred on the aft down-firing thrusters for attitude maneuvering
with some approaching the 125-second duration limit for steady-state firings. Also, the
high duty cycles during the attitude-hold operations require evaluation to determine if
the 1000-cycle/hour limit was exceeded. As a result, the RCS vernier thruster usage
on STS-71 requires detailed evaluation to assess the long-term effects on the RCS
hardware.
From a certified life standpoint, concerns exist primarily with the chamber/nozzle
coating damage, which would require chamber replacement. Coating damage is driven
primarily by thermal cycles. Although all vernier thruster usage parameters vary
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depending on the mission profile and mission duration, the average vernier mission
thermal cycles for the previous 54 missions are as follows:
a. F5L and F5R thrusters - 42 thermal cycles per mission;
b. L5D and R5D thrusters - 105 thermal cycles per mission; and
c. L5L and R5R thrusters - 50 thermal cycles per mission.
With the STS-71 thermal cycles being on the order of 1.3 to 3 times higher than the
average, chamber wear-out rate would be expected to increase if future Mir- and ISS-
docked missions result in similar usage. This condition poses a spares risk to the
program and must be evaluated by the engineering and logistics areas. If RCS vernier
thruster usage can be optimized (reduced) by improved DAP models and/or primary
RCS thruster usage, the vernier usage may be significantly reduced from the levels
seen on STS-71, assuming future missions of similar duration.
A software patch is being developed for STS-74 to enable DAP logic that may alleviate
the high propellant consumption. As assessment of spares is also underway by both
Engineering and Logistics personnel.
Thermal issues continue to be a concern for future ISS-docked scenarios in which cold
vernier thrusters and hot primary thrusters are expected. A plan for recertifying the
thruster valves for the expected ISS thermal environment is being developed.
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
During the postlanding operations, KSC used the -508 cooling cart to maintain the
evaporator outlet temperature between 35 °F and 40 °F to demonstrate this capability
for future ISS missions carrying the mini-pressurized logistics module (MPLM). Further
demonstrations are not required during Shuttle-Mir.
ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM
During the Mir/Orbiter repressurization, the high oxygen (O=) flow caused the Freon
cooling loop temperature to drop from 40 °F to 35 °F at the 02 heat exchanger. This
raises a concern for Oz transfer to the ISS as Freon temperatures need to remain
above 32 °F to prevent freezing the water loops. Analysis of the ISS repressurization
effects on Freon temperature will be performed. Upcoming Shuttle-Mir
repressurizations will not be as extensive as STS-71, so Freon temperatures
approaching 32 °F should not be a concern for the remainder of these flights.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING SUBSYSTEMS
Communications link performance degradation was observed during the Shuttle/Mir
docked configuration. Signal degradation and/or complete link dropouts have been
attributed to signal deflection/defraction (multipath effects) and blockage from the Mir
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structure. The premission analysis through computer simulations using planned
attitude information provided a valuable insight into this condition. The postmission
correlation of the premission results and the real-time data was performed to calibrate
the analysis model for future Mir flights. Similar analyses for Space Station assembly
flight configurations are recommended to determine the communications profile and
provide data for flight planning.
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
The STS-71 Shuttle/Mir flight demonstrated that the Orbiter can control and stabilize
large space structures attached to the Orbiter. Although each of the Space Station
assembly flights will be a different vehicle configuration, the results of this flight provide
significant confidence that the process used to develop control system designs was
very effective. The results also demonstrate that the notch-filter upgrade designed to
stabilize these types of configurations worked well. Future flights will test/demonstrate
other Shuttle upgrades, including the alternate primary RCS mode and the minimum-
angle thruster-selection algorithm, further validating their performance for Space
Station analysis and application. Additional Shuttle/Mir flight tests or software
upgrades may be proposed to demonstrate and/or provide increased margins to
modeling errors for later Shuttle-controlled assembly configurations.
The specific issue concerning the modeling error of the aft down-firing vernier thruster
has resulted in a software solution that should eliminate a significant portion of the
unrequired propellant consumption that was observed on the STS-71 mission. This
software solution will be patched into the STS-74 I-loads. An analysis to determine the
exact effects of plume self-impingement from all the down-firing thrusters has been
initiated. Its conclusions will be verified based on STS-71 and STS-74 flight results.
The model (force and moment) of these thrusters in the flight software will then be
updated to accurately represent actual vehicle performance.
THERMAL EFFECTS
Significant thermal effects from the Mir on the Orbiter sill Iongerons and bondlines were
observed during the inertial orientation (IO) 1.1 attitude. However, this condition is not
expected to adversely affect the payload bay door closure "anytime return"
requirements for the ISS missions.
A DTO is recommended to assess the concerns of potential violations of the vernier
RCS non-operational limit of 90 °F for ISS missions by inhibiting forward vernier RCS
thruster operations in a cold attitude
The TCS was shut down after 1.5 hours of operations due to the temperature rise rate
being higher than predicted. This condition may be an issue for the warmer station
attitudes.
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An evaluation of the thermal impact of the APAS on the ISS APAS hardware will be
conducted after the STS-71 thermal math model correlation has been completed.
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT
Stowage and item tracking procedures will be reviewed after the destowage inventory
has been completed. Consideration may be given new procedures to track items that
have been removed from the original stowage location. Additionally, procedures to
stow items in chronological order and with associated types of items will be
investigated. A procedure of this type would expedite locating items and would prevent
other items in the same stowage location from being misplaced.
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MIR RENDEZVOUSI DOCKING, AND JOINT OPERATIONS
SUMMARY
The STS-71 mission was the first of seven planned Space Shuttle-Mir rendezvous,
docking and crew-transfer missions that are planned to be completed between 1995
and 1997 during Phase 1 of the Space Station Program. During the first two days of
the STS-71 mission, a number of small RCS and OMS firings were completed to bring
the Orbiter within 8 nmi. of the Mir Space Station. The terminal phase initiation (TI)
maneuver was performed at 180:09:31:01.2 G.m.t. (01:13:58:42.2 MET), and during the
following orbit the Orbiter closed to within one-half mile of the Mir Space Station. The
rendezvous radar and trajectory control sensor (TCS) were used extensively during the
rendezvous process. In performing the rendezvous, the Atlantis aimed for a point
directly below the Mir, along the Earth radius vector (R-Bar), which is an imaginary line
drawn between the Mir center of gravity and the center of the Earth. This method of
approach reduced the number of braking firings that were required as natural forces
during this rendezvous trajectory braked the approach more than approaching the Mir
from directly in front of it. The reduction in the number of RCS thruster firings in close
proximity to the Mir reduced the amount of RCS plume impingement on the Mir.
DOCKED ACTIVITIES
The Orbiter docked with the Mir at 180:13:08:17.9 G.m.t. (01:18:35:22.9 MET), and the
hatch was opened for initial greetings and the transfer of all seven Orbiter personnel to
the Mir for joint photographs and the beginning of joint operations. Following these
activities, the Mir-19 seat liners, the highest-priority item, were transferred to the Mir.
With this transfer completed, the home vehicle for the Mir-18 crew was Atlantis and the
home vehicle for the Mir-19 crew was the Mir. During the five days of docked
operations, transfers to the Mir from the Atlantis included the following:
a. Russian extravehicular activity (EVA) tool;
b. U. S. EVA tool;
c. Russian soft bag containing pressure leak sealant;
d. Russian food;
e. TREK detector boxes (Boxes for return of witness plates that had been
installed on the exterior of the Mir for an extended period. The plates were retrieved
during an EVA and were returned to the sponsor in the boxes); and
f. Russian Mir-19 flight data file.
Transfer items from the Mir to the Shuttle included the following:
a. Command processor;
b. Mir surface and airborne samples;
c. Salyut-5B computer;
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d. Elements of the TORU (avionics boxes that were carried on Spektr to allow a
crew-commanded docking of Spektr to Mir, should the automated docking
system have failed.)
e. Urine bags;
f. Metabolic cold storage containers;
g. Mir water samples; and
h. Foam padding from Spektr.
In addition, 200 percent more water was transferred to the Mir than requested prior to
the flight by the Russians.
UNDOCKING ACTIVITIES
The final preparations for undocking were performed, and the Orbiter undocking
activities were successfully completed at 185:11:09:41.8 G.m.t. (06:15:37:22.8 MET).
The Atlantis was moved to a distance of 400 feet from the Mir at which time a
fly-around of the Mir was initiated. The Orbiter circled the Mir 1 1/2 times, and during
that period detailed engineering photographs and videos were taken of the Space
Station.
During the Soyuz free-flight following the Shuttle undocking from the Mir, the Mir
computer experienced a problem. The problem caused a loss of control/free drift. The
Mir was nearing the end of a maneuver with rates of approximately 0.2 dog/see on the
vehicle. After an unsuccessful attempt to restore control, the ground made a decision
to redock the Soyuz early, and this was performed successfully. The Russians
reported that this was a software problem, in which a command over-wrote a segment
of computer memory used by the control system. The gyrodines spun down, and the
Mir was left adrift. Testing of the computer verified that this was not a hardware
problem. On July 5, the software was restored to the correct state and the control
system resumed nominal operations.
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PAYLOADS
The joint Russian and U. S. scientific investigations, which began on Mir-18 and
continued on the STS-71 mission, provided data in seven scientific and medical
disciplines. These seven disciplines were metabolic research; cardiovascular and
pulmonary research; neurosensory research; hygiene, sanitation, and radiation
research; behavior and performance research; fundamental biology research; and
microgravity research. A total of 28 experiments were conducted as part of the joint
cooperative effort. Fifteen of these were continued on the STS-71 mission and 11 are
being continued on the Mir-19 mission. Data collected during the Mir-18 mission as
well as that collected during STS-71 were returned to Earth for analysis by the U. S.
and Russian science communities.
Following the successful docking on flight day 3, joint science investigations were
conducted on the Atlantis and the Mir until undocking on flight day 8. Additional
countermeasures and data collections were conducted on flight days 9 and 10.
Overall, the mission was extremely successful. Not only were the original preplanned
science sessions completed, but additional science-related activities were performed.
With the addition of the unscheduled science activities, successful data collection
achieved 110-percent completion, even though a few individual sessions were not
performed. Included with the successful science activities were numerous science
hardware and science resupply transfers. These transfers included the retrieval of all
of the science samples collected during Mir-18; two kits containing quail eggs, whose
development has been stopped; and the science resupply for Mir-19 research.
Transfers from the Atlantis to the Mir were 100-percant complete based on premission
planning, and transfers from the Mir to the Atlantis were 92-percent complete. The
less-than 100-percent transfer from the Mir resulted from unused science gear onboard
the Mir being left there for future use.
SPACELAB
The Spacelab systems supported the STS-71 mission activities without any problems.
The SL-M mission required a unique Spacelab configuration. To accommodate the
Orbiter c. g. requirements, the Spacelab was located further aft in the payload bay than
on previous missions. This relocation required a new tunnel extension that was
installed in front of the Spacelab transfer tunnel.
The interior of the Spacelab module also was configured uniquely for this mission. Due
to the mass limitations of the payload, one port and two starboard racks were removed.
These rack spaces provided extra room for the crew to use for temporary and unique
stowage of logistics transfer items. The Spacelab supported long-duration-stay
countermeasure-exercise protocols and other life sciences experiments.
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METABOLIC RESEARCH
Six metabolic experiments were conducted to examine a wide range of physiological
responses as investigators strived to understand how the body's mechanisms work in
space, and how gravity affects the body on Earth.
The STS-71 mission allowed continuation and expansion of the studies begun on the
Mir to learn more about human metabolism and endocrinology, to determine how fluids
redistribute themselves in the body, and to determine how microgravity affects bone
density and red blood cell production, in addition, crew members aboard Atlantis
participated in studies to determine if prolonged exposure to microgravity affects the
body's ability to mount an antibody response, and whether immune cells are altered by
exposure to microgravity.
CARDIOVASCULAR AND PULMONARY RESEARCH
Deconditioning of the cardiovascular and pulmonary system, with the occurrence of
orthostatic intolerance (lightheadedness upon standing), has been observed in
crewmembers returning from long-duration spaceflight. As a result, this condition is of
primary interest to the medical researchers. The researchers measured blood volume
changes during flight as well as pooling of blood in the legs and abdomen after entry.
Exercise as well as both the Russian and American lower body negative pressure
(LBNP) units were evaluated as countermeasures to protect the returning
crewmembers. The LBNP units mimicked increasing and decreasing arterial pressure
by applying suction and pressure to the neck while heart rate responses to the
changing pressure stimulus were measured.
The Mir-18 crewmembers returned to Earth in the reclining position and their changes
in heart rate, blood pressure, voice, and posture were measured during the entry
phase. After landing, the Mir-18 crew performed a =stand test" during which the extent
of orthostatic intolerance was measured.
NEUROSENSORY RESEARCH
Neurosensor investigations that were begun during the Mir-18 mission focused on the
mixed messages that the body receives when the brain integrates nerve impulses from
the eyes, inner ear, muscles and joints. The brain cannot rely on gravity as a constant
in determining body position and orientation. Data were collected for two of the studies
in an effort to understand how humans adapt to spaceflight and readapt to the Earth
environment. In addition, data were collected on the neuromuscular function and
muscle deconditioning during extended spaceflights by measuring muscle tone,
strength, and endurance using electromyography, as well as utilization of oxygen
during treadmill and other forms of exercise.
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HYGIENE, SANITATION, AND RADIATION RESEARCH
As microgravity is not the only environmental challenge facing spaceflight
crewmembers, hygiene and sanitation data were collected concerning recycled air and
water, possible microbial contamination, and radiation exposure to understand the
condition and ensure good health in closed living systems.
Two investigations evaluated the radiation environment experienced during the
extended stay in space, and two other investigations were performed to determine the
presence of microbes or trace chemicals in the air and water consumed by the
crewmembers. Also, microbial samples were collected from the Mir and Atlantis, as
well as from the crewmembers themselves, for postflight analysis. Samples of air and
water were also collected throughout the Mir-18 mission and during STS-71 for
postflight analysis for the presence of atmospheric and water contaminants.
BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE RESEARCH
Behavioral and performance data were collected throughout the three-month Mir-18
mission for use in a study of the long-term effects of microgravity on muscle
coordination and mental acuity, and these data were returned to Earth aboard Atlantis.
A Russian spacecraft control simulator was used before, during and after the flight.
This simulator will allow researchers to measure crewmember's functional state and
manual control performance.
FUNDAMENTAL BIOLOGY RESEARCH
Fundamental biology data were collected to determine through postflight testing how
weightlessness affects embryo development of pre-fertilized quail eggs. These eggs
were incubated onboard the Mir, and the incubation process was stopped at various
stages of development by placing the embryos in a fixative solution.
Improved sensors were also carried to orbit by Atlantis for use in the Mir Station
greenhouse by the Mir 19 crew. After addition of these sensors, the updated
greenhouse was ready for plant experiments on future Mir missions.
MICROGRAVITY RESEARCH
Inanimate objects and materials, including crystals, are affected by the unique
microgravity environment. As a result, the protein crystal growth experiment, discussed
in the following paragraph, was placed onboard the Mir for an extended period of time
(until November 1995).
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PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROWTH EXPERIMENT
The Protein Crystal Growth Experiment, with several hundred protein samples, was
carried on STS-71, and was placed in the Mir Space Station where it will remain until
the STS-74 crew retrieves the samples in November of 1995. Researchers were able
to observe the crystallization of a number of large proteins that may be used in basic
biological research, pharmacology and drug development after return to Earth.
SPACE ACCELERATION MEASUREMENT EXPERIMENT
The Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS), which has flown on many
missions during the Shuttle Program, was attached to the Mir Space Station, where
data will be collected during the months and years to come in support of the Protein
Crystal Growth Experiment.
IMAX CAMERA SYSTEM
A total of seven rolls of IMAX 70-mm film was exposed during the STS-71 mission.
Two rolls were exposed on scenes exterior to the Shuttle and five rolls were used for
interior photography. One of the two IMAX microphones failed during the flight, thus
only a single voice channel was recorded during filming. However, this loss did not
significantly affect IMAX operations.
IMAX activities went very well, although scene set-up took longer than expected.
Scenes taken included middeck activities, Spacelab activities, the approach to the Mir,
flyaround of the Mir after undocking, and interior Mir activities.
SHUTTLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT-II
The Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II) was used to communicate with
four schools in the United States and one school in Russia. STS-71 was the
eighteenth mission on which the SAREX was flown.
SAREX contacts were made with the Benbrook, Texas, elementary school; the Forrest
Avenue School in Hudson, Massachusetts; the Redlands High School in Redlands,
California; the Suffolk Community College at Seldon, New Jersey; and the school in
Yessentuki, Russia. The Russians were very pleased with the contact. Additionally,
SAREX ground personnel supported troubleshooting of the Shuttle VHF audio
problems discussed in the GFE/FCE section of this report.
RISK MITIGATION EXPERIMENTS
All eight test cases for Risk Mitigation Experiment (RME)1301, Mated Model and Mir
Structural Dynamic Test, were successfully performed beginning at 183:12:32 G.m.t.
(04:17:00 MET). Analysis of the data shows that the mated stack structural dynamic
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characteristics were within the loads and flight control margins predicted in the preflight
analysis. The results indicate the models were within design tolerances; however, less
free-play was apparent in the data than originally expected. The test results were
reviewed with RSC-Energia loads and flight control specialists. Results of the test
verified that the Shuttle Primary RCS ALT DAP could have been used for mated
maneuvers and attitude hold on STS-71. Mir attitude control of the stack was as
predicted.
A data take was scheduled and completed for the RME 1310, Shuttle/Mir Alignment
Stability Experiment, without the Mir star tracker.
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ORBITER DOCKING SYSTEM
The Orbiter docking system (ODS) operation successfully demonstrated the ability of
the Androgynous Peripheral Docking System (APDS) to mate the Orbiter to a large
space structure, the Mir, and to accommodate all mated load operations. Also, data
obtained during the docking phase compared well with the preflight analyses that were
performed, and this provides confidence for future docking-related activities for the ISS.
The Atlantis (OV-104) and the Mir Space Station were linked by an ODS (see following
figure) that was jointly developed by the RSC Energia, Kaliningrad, Russia; the Orbiter
prime contractor Rockwell International, Downey, CA.; and NASA. The ODS consisted
of an external airlock, a supporting truss structure, a docking base, avionics required to
operate the system, and a 632-1b Russian-built APDS, which is mounted externally on
top of the airlock and docking base. The ODS measures nearly 15 feet wide, 6 1/2 feet
long, 13 1/2 feet high, and weighs more than 3,500 lb. The ODS was installed near the
forward end of the Orbiter payload bay and was connected by short tunnels to the
existing airlock inside the Orbiter's pressurized cabin and the Spacelab module, which
was mounted aft of the airlock in the payload bay.
The APDS is controlled from a Russian-built aft flight deck panel, through nine
Russian-built avionics boxes, which are mounted in the bottom of the airlock. Joint
RussiarVU. S. cables connect the control panel, avionics boxes and the mechanism.
The APDS is a hybrid version of the docking system used by the Russians for the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in 1975. It differed from that docking system in the
following ways:
a. It is more compact with an overall external diameter of 60 inches compared to
80 inches for the ASTP, although the inner egress tunnel diameter remains
approximately the same;
b. The APDS docking mechanism has 12 structural latches, compared to eight
on the ASTP unit;
c. The APDS guide ring and extend/retract mechanism are packaged inside the
egress tunnel rather than being outside of the mechanism as they were on ASTP; and
d. The three guide petals on the APDS point inboard rather than outboard.
Both Atlantis and the Mir were equipped with an APDS that had a three-petal
androgynous capture ring mounted on six interconnected ball screw shock absorbers,
which arrest the relative motion between the two vehicles and prevent a collision. The
Orbiter crew's primary visual aid for aligning the docking mechanism during rendezvous
was a television camera that was mounted inside the airlock of the ODS. The camera
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viewed a target at the center of the Mir mechanism through a window in the upper
hatch.
Docking was initiated when the Orbiter and ODS were maneuvered to bring the active
ODS on the Orbiter into contact with the passive docking system on the Mir. The
maximum allowable axial rate of approach of the two vehicles was 0.2 ft/sec. The
docking of these two massive vehicles was complicated by the Orbiter's large center-of-
mass offset from the ODS longitudinal axis, which significantly reduces the effective
mass of the vehicle at the docking interface, making capture more difficult.
Five seconds after capture, dampers were activated for 30 seconds and the relative
motion between the two vehicles subsided. At this point, the vehicles were aligned and
the retraction phase of the docking was initiated by the latched capture ring. Structural
latching was complete at the end of the capture ring retraction process.
This first use of the APDS on the Orbiter occurred successfully on this mission. The
initial preparations for docking were accomplished by system power-up and guide-ring
extension, activities which took place on flight day 2 beginning at approximately
179:15:44 G.m.t. (00:20:12 MET). All operations were nominal with guide-ring
extension performed within the dual motor planned time of approximately 2.5 minutes.
The actual docking to the Mir occurred on June 29, with the ODS being powered up at
180:12:25 G.m.t. (01:16:53 MET). Docking contact conditions were well within the
allowables. The closing rate (docking axial velocity) was very near the targeted
0.1 ft/sec and angular misalignments were small. Post contract thrusting (PCT) began
about one-half second before capture. Capture occurred at 180:13:00:13.9 G.m.t.
(01:18:27:18.9 MET) Docking loads were reconstructed from flight data. The maximum
axial load was about 1000 kg, compared to an allowable of 1900 kg. It should be noted
that the loads were substantial because of the force induced by the PCT, even though
contact conditions were benign. The electromagnetic dampers were activated about
five seconds after capture and remained on for 30 seconds, as planned. The ring-
extend command occurred about 60 seconds after capture. The crew initiated the
automatic interrupt, as planned, to allow the APDS damping of the relative motion. The
ring-in command followed about 75 seconds later. Ring extraction and structural hook
drive were performed nominally with the docking completed at 180:13:08:17.9 G.m.t.
(01:18:35:22.9 MET), and nominal system pressurization followed.
During the pre-undocking vestibule depressurization at 184:20:07 G.m.t.
(06:00:35 MET), the rate at which the vestibule pressure was decreasing was lower
than planned (Flight Problem STS-71-V-06). Initially, it was hypothesized that the vent
inlet was blocked by mylar blankets that were covered with small pin holes. The pin
holes were allowing a very slow venting of the vestibule pressure. A review of the
manufacturing drawings revealed that no hole had been cut in the blankets over the
vent to allow the valve to vent properly. Also, the test history showed that no
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depressurization test of the completed configuration with blankets had been performed
prior to flight.
At the end of the docked phase of the mission, the latches were unhooked after the
docking base was depressurized, and the preloaded separation springs separated the
two vehicles at a low velocity. Undocking was completed at 185:11:09:41.8 G.m.t.
(05:15:37:22.8 MET).
The following table shows the analytical predictions and processed inertial
measurement unit (IMU) data for the Orbiter's undocking angular rates. The analytical
predictions are a best-case estimate and are based upon the Orbiter's mass properties
at the time of docking.
Structural axis
(_x, deg/sec
o_y,deg/sec
(0z, deg/sec
Analytical
-0.003
Measured
0.010
-01101 -0.074
0.000 0.002
The Orbiter's measured roll rate (rex) during the flight was notably higher than
predicted. The predictions were based upon the 12 active structural hooks releasing
simultaneously, while in reality the system has two separate motors driving alternate
gangs of structural hooks. The undocking events were recorded during the flight in the
following order:
1. Hooks no. 1 open position-185:11:09:40.811 G.m.t. (05:15:37:21.823 MET);
2. Undock complete - 185:11:09:41.892 G.m.t. (05:15:37:22.904 MET); and
3. Hooks no. 2 open position - 185:11:09:43.243 G.m.t. (05:15:37:24.355 MET).
In the actual hardware, the active hooks do not release at the same time.
The Orbiter's predicted pitch rate (my) was approximately 25 percent greater than the
measured value. The predictions were based upon the maximum allowable capability
of the separation devices as quoted in the APDS procurement specification. The
Orbiter's yaw rate ((oz) was a small value in both cases. The reasons for predicting
different o_xand coy separation rates are currently being investigated.
24
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
All Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) systems performed as expected. The SRB prelaunch
countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or Operational
Maintenance Requirements and Specification Document (OMRSD) violations were
encountered. Data show that all SRB systems performed as designed and no in-flight
anomalies were identified from the review of the data.
The low-pressure heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was used intermittently to
maintain the case/nozzle joint temperatures within the required LCC ranges. At
T-15 minutes, the high-pressure purge was activated to inert the SRB aft skirt.
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the External Tank (ET) at
T+123.56 seconds, and the recovery reports indicate that all deceleration subsystems
performed satisfactorily. Both SRBs were recovered and returned to KSC for
inspection and refurbishment.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
The Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) performed the assigned functions
satisfactorily, and no LCC or OMRSD violations were noted. All RSRM temperatures
were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the countdown. The table on the
following page provides data on the RSRM propulsion parameters.
Data indicate that the flight performance of both RSRMs was well within the allowable
performance envelopes, and was typical of the performance observed on previous
flights. The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 79 °F.
The maximum trace shape variation of pressure versus time was calculated to be
approximately 1.8 percent at 73.5 seconds (left motor) and approximately 1.2 percent at
80.0 seconds (right motor) versus the 3.2 percent allowable. Both values are well
within the historical data base.
The field joint heaters were operated over 35 hours during the three countdowns.
Power was applied to the heating element 16 percent (average) of the time during the
LCC time-frame to maintain the field-joint temperatures within their normal operating
range.
Igniter joint heaters operated for over 50 hours during the three countdowns. Power
was applied to the igniter heating elements 26 percent of the time to maintain the
igniter joint temperatures within their normal operating range.
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RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter Left motor, 79 °F
Predicted I Actual
Impulse gates
1-20, 10e Ibf-sec
1-60, 10e Ibf-sec
I-AT r 106 Ibf-sec
Vacuum Ispr Ibf-sec/Ibm
Bum rate, irdsec @ 60 °F
at 625 psia
Burn rate, in/sec @ 79 °F
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds •
Ignition interval
Web time ='
50 psia cue time
Action time ='
Separation command
PMBT, °F
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psia/10 ms
Decay time, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff Imbalance Impulse
differential t Klbf-sec
66.14
176.12
297.19
65.84
176.57
298.08
268.6 269.4
0.3678 0.3680
0.3728 0.3730
0.232
109.0
118.7
120.8
123.6
N/A
108.5
118.8
120.9
123.7
Right motor, 79 °F
Predicted I Actual
66.16
176.15
297.00
66.00
176.08
297.25
268.6 268.8
0.3681 0.3680
0.3731 0.3730
0.232
108.9
118.6
120.7
123.6
79
N/A
108.8
118.3
120.1
123.7
79 79 79
90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
2.8 3.1 2.8 2.5
Predicted
N/A
Actual
406.2
Impulse Imbalance = left motor minus right motor
• All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a
b Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval).
The aft skirt purge operated for over 10 hours to maintain the nozzle-to-case joint
above 75 °F. At T-15 minutes, the pressure was increased to inert the aft skirt
compartment. The calculated flex bearing mean bulk temperature (FBMBT) was
81 OF.
All ground environmental instrumentation and operational instrumentation performed
within established requirements. All available data were recorded and evaluated.
The postflight inspection indicated nominal performance. All J-joints (igniter and field)
performed as designed. During the postflight disassembly of the left-hand and right-
hand nozzle assemblies, the inspection revealed an abnormal condition in joint no. 3.
Joint no. 3 joins the nose inlet assembly and the throat assembly with 72 bolts and a
primary and secondary O-ring. The inspection after the disassembly of the joints
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revealed a gas path through the room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) back-fill, with soot
up to the primary O-ring. Also, heat effect and erosion were observed on the left-hand
primary O-ring (Flight Problem STS-71-M-1), Similar gas paths have been noted on 11
of 96 previous RSRM nozzle joints of this configuration (three static tests and eight
flights). However, associated with this STS-71 gas path was a slight heat effect on the
primary O-ring, whereas prior experience included only local heat effects to joint
insulation phenolics. Heat effect existed in four small areas of the primary O-ring within
a 1.78 inch circumferential distance. A maximum depth of 0.005 to 0.006 inch of
removed O-ring material was detected on the 0.210 inch cross-sectional diameter
O-ring. The primary O-ring maintained seal throughout the flight and the secondary O-
ring was unaffected, in summary, the overall heat effects to the STS-71 left-hand joint
varied only slightly from prior experience.
A detailed evaluation plan for the left-hand nozzle has been instituted. Photography
and documentation of the joint is in progress. Samples have been taken of the affected
areas, and these are being tested to determine the condition of the components. The
assessment activities also include taking samples of/from the affected and unaffected
areas for laboratory testing, evaluating all process data from the manufacturing of this
nozzle and comparing it to history, evaluating the prelaunch/launch/recovery
environments, performing sub-scale testing of the backfill operation to simulate the
condition and assess potential causes, performing thermal analyses to simulate the
STS-71 results and assess limit conditions, developing a fault-tree analysis, and other
activities that are found necessary as a result of the investigation.
The STS-70 nozzles were evaluated upon receipt at the contractor facility, and their
condition will be reported in the STS-70 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report.
EXTERNALTANK
All objectives and requirements associated with the ET propellant loading and flight
operations were met. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated
satisfactorily. No LCC or OMRSD violations were identified nor were any in-flight
anomalies noted.
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown; however,
no ice or frost was observed on the acreage areas of the ET. No unexpected quantities
of ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen (LO2) or liquid hydrogen (LH=)
feedlines, the pressurization line brackets, or along the LH= protuberance air load
(PAL) ramps. All observations were acceptable based on NSTS-08303. The Ice/Frost
Red Team reported that no anomalous thermal protection system (TPS) conditions
existed on the ET.
The nose cone purge heater and temperature control system operated successfully.
Measured nose cone mass flow rate was within the Interface Control Document (ICD)
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requirement of 9 to 16 Ibm/min, as it has been since a critical flow nozzle was installed
to limit the flowrate.
The intertank purge heater and temperature control system operated successfully.
Intertank temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits, all components within
the intertank performed satisfactorily, and no hazardous gas violations were noted.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and flight.
The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure slump was
13.8 psid.
Post-separation photographs of the ET were taken with an umbilical-mounted 35mm
camera and two 16mm movie cameras. The following observations were made from
the photography:
a. Eight areas of foam missing from intertank stringer tops, each approximately
12 to 24 inches long (possible contributor to above-average Orbiter lower surface tile
damage on this flight);
b. One divot just aft of the -Y bipod attachment;
c. Two divots at or near the station 1377 liquid oxygen feedline support inboard
attachment; and
d. Above average "popcoming" in the aft liquid hydrogen acreage foam
insulation and on the thrust strut and liquid oxygen feed line flange foam insulation
closeouts.
Similar observations have been noted on previous flights, and none of these conditions
are considered anomalous.
ET separation occurred as planned, and the ET entry and breakup was within the
footprint. The posfflight predicted ET intact impact point was 2 nmi. downrange from
the preflight prediction.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES
All Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) parameters were normal throughout the
prelaunch countdown and were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous
flights. Engine-ready was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine
start and thrust buildup were normal.
Flight data indicate that SSME performance during start, mainstage, throttling,
shutdown and propellant dump operations was normal. High pressure oxidizer
turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures were
28
well within specification limits throughout engine operation. Space Shuttle main engine
cutoff occurred at T + 510.48 seconds. No failures or significant SSME problems or
anomalies were identified.
Analysis of the data showed a number of items that merit discussion::
1. The review of the SSME 3 chamber coolant valve actuator (CCVA) actuator
checkout module (ACM) data showed very little margin to the channel A-channel B
position differential limit. The data indicates that run-to-run variation could cause the
actuator to fail the checkout limit (1.5 percent) during the next set of checkouts. The
ACM limit ensures that no actuator will violate the rotary variable differential
transformer (RVDT) miscompare limit of 3 percent.
2. The SSME 3 hot gas injection pressure measurement froze at engine start
plus 310 seconds. This phenomenon has been observed on previous flights and is
attributed to ice formation in the sense line.
3. The SSME 2 HPFTP coolant line pressure shifted at engine start plus
20 seconds and the amount of shift is within the previous experience base.
4. The SSME 2 main fuel valve (MFV) skin temperature sensor was erratic at
engine start plus 440 seconds. Debonding of the sensor as well as an open circuit in
the measurement have been seen on previous flights. The measurement is used for
prelaunch leakage verification and is not used during mainstage.
5. The SSME 3 MFV skin temperature sensor spiked at engine start plus
390 seconds. The cause of this spike in the data is being evaluated for corrective
action.
6. The SSME 3 HPFTP speed sensor spiked at engine cutoff plus 3.9 seconds.
The cause of this spike in the data is being evaluated for corrective action.
7. The SSME 1 main combustion chamber (MCC) fuel injection pressure sensor
experienced a negative 26 psia spike at engine start plus 108 seconds. The SSME 3
MCC chamber pressure (Pc) pressure sensor experienced a positive 15 psi spike at
engine start plus 75.6 seconds. Likewise, the $SME 3 fuel system purge pressure
sensor experienced a positive 3 psi spike at engine start plus 76.6 seconds. All of
these pressure spikes have the characteristics of the noise (externally induced) spikes
which have been experienced since the introduction of the block II controller.
8. The oxidizer preburner oxidizer valve (OPOV) liquid oxygen supply skin
temperature sensor had a slow response during mainstage, indicating a debonding of
the sensor, and this is within the experience data base. The measurement is used for
prelaunch leakage verification and is not used during mainstage.
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SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
Data analysis has shown nominal performance of the Shuttle Range Safety System
(SRSS). The SRSS closed-loop testing was completed as scheduled during the launch
countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were armed and system inhibits
turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS measurements indicated that the system
operated as designed throughout the countdown and flight.
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and the SRB system power was turned
off prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the MPS was as expected with no OMRSD or LCC
violations. During LO2 and LH= loading, there were no stop-flows or reverts. During
the countdown for the first launch attempt, some minor problems were noted, but none
of the problems had any impact on the preparations for launch.
During the countdown for the second launch attempt, only one problem of significance
was noted. The SSME 1 liquid hydrogen (LH2) recirculation valve was slow in closing
at T-10 seconds (Flight Problem STS-71-V-03) The valve specification allows
1.1 seconds from the loss of open switch to acquisition of close (sw/sw) and
2.0 seconds from loss of open power to acquisition of close switch (sig/sw). The
STS-71 times were 3.190 seconds from sw/sw and 4.282 seconds from sig/sw. The
valve is a criticality 1R2 for premature engine shutdown. The slow closure of the valve
had no effect on the mission, and the valve was replaced during postflight turnaround
activities.
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the
Orbiter aft compartment (which occurred shortly after the start of fast-fill) was
approximately 120 ppm.
The liquid hydrogen (LH=) loading operations were normal during all phases of the
countdown. The analysis of loading system data shows the LH2 load at the end of
replenish was 231,841 Ibm. Compared to the inventory (predicted) load of
231,832 Ibm, this assessment yields a difference of +0.004 percent, which is well
within the required MPS loading accuracy.
The liquid oxygen (LO=) loading operations were normal during all phases of the launch
countdown. Based on an analysis of the loading system data, the LOz load at the end
of replenish was 1,388,264 Ibm. Compared with the inventory (predicted) load of
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1,387,844 Ibm, this assessment yields a difference of +0.03 percent, which is well
within the required loading accuracy.
The charging of the helium system to flight pressure levels was performed as
scheduled, and all pressures and temperatures met the LCC limits. The Orbiter
midbody helium concentration increased to 750 ppm during and after helium bottle
pressurization. During the on-orbit phase of the mission, the SSME 2 helium system
decayed at the rate of 0.4 Ibm/day, and the requirement for this system is a maximum of
0.26 Ibm/day. This leak did not impact the mission in any manner. Helium usage
during entry was a nominal 57.8 Ibm. Postflight troubleshooting revealed a loose fitting
on the SSME 2 helium tank 8. This tank had been removed during the Orbiter
maintenance down period (OMDP) to allow access for structural inspections. No
further leakage was noted after tightening the fitting.
Ascent MPS performance was nominal. Data indicate that the LO2 and LH2
pressurization systems performed as planned, and that all net positive suction pressure
(NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The ET pressurization system
functioned properly throughout engine start and flight. The minimum LO2 ullage
pressure experienced during the period of the ullage pressure slump was 13.7 psid.
The SSME 3 GH2 FCV exhibited some sluggishness during the last half of ascent
(Flight Problem STS-71-V-04). Three cycles violated the File IX requirement of 0.3
second maximum with values of 0.4 second. Ten cycles were 0.2 to 0.3 second
maximum, which is slower than normal. This amount of sluggishness is considered
minor and had no effect on overall GH2 system pressurization. As a part of planned
GH2 pressurization system modifications, OV-104 is scheduled to receive its reoriented
manifold kit with newly refurbished FCVs during the next flow (STS-74). The currently
installed valves will be sent back to the vendor where they will be disassembled,
inspected, and cleaned per existing procedures to alleviate sluggishness.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS performed nominally throughout the mission. A total of 4,129.6 Ibm of RCS
propellants were consumed during the mission. In addition, during left OMS and right
OMS interconnect operations, a total of 21.43 percent (2775 Ibm) of the OMS
propellants were consumed by the RCS.
At 187:11:23:27 G.m.t. (08:15:51:08 MET) during the RCS hot-fire, primary RCS
thruster R2U failed off because of low chamber pressure (Pc) (Flight Problem
STS-71-V-07). The thruster was deselected after 320 msec when the Pc failed to
exceed the deselect limit of 36 psia in three consecutive redundancy management
(RM) cycles. The actual peak Pc was 2.4 psia. The injector temperature trend
indicated that both the oxidizer and fuel flow occurred. Injector temperatures and
inertial measurement unit (IMU) rates both confirmed the low performance. The failure
signature is typical of previous fail-off indications related to nitrate-contaminated
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oxidizer valves. The most probable failure mode is nitrate contamination of the oxidizer
valve pilot stage, and this restricted pilot flow and prevented valve upper cavity
pressure bleed-off, which is required to hydraulically actuate the valve main stage.
This thruster will be replaced prior to the next flight of this vehicle.
Orbital Maneuverin,q Subsystem
The OMS performed very satisfactorily throughout the mission. A total of 20,299 Ibm of
OMS propellants were used during the mission. Of this total, 2,775 Ibm was used by
the RCS during OMS interconnect operations. The remainder was used by the OMS
during the six maneuvers shown in the following table. Total firing time for the left OMS
engine was 465.5 seconds and for the right OMS engine was 443.9 seconds.
OMS FIRINGS
Firing
OMS firing Engine Ignition time, G.m.t./MET duration,
seconds
OMS-2 Both 178:20:15:16.8 G.m.t. 47.7
00:00:42:57.8 MET
OMS-3 Both 178:23:10:25.2 G.m.t. 136.9
00:03:38:06.2 MET
OMS-4 Left 179:10:49:35.8 G.m.t. 12.4
00:15:17:16.8 MET
Both 46OMS-5
(NC-4)
OMS-6
(TI)
Deorbit
Left
Both
180:07:57:17.2 G.m.t.
01:12:24:58.2 MET
180:09:31:01.2 G.m.t.
01:13:58:42.2 MET
188:13:45:19.3 G.m.t.
09:18:13:00.3 MET
9.2
213.3
AV, ft/sec
75.3
220.7
10.1
75.0
7.2
373
Early in the mission, the left forward fuelgaging probe was inoperative; however,
beginning with the OMS-4 maneuver, the fuel probe operated properly for the
remainder of the mission.
Power Reactant Stora,qe and Distribution Subsystem
The PRSD subsystem performed nominally throughout the mission except as discussed
in the following paragraphs. A total of 2,908 Ibm of oxygen and 343 Ibm of hydrogen
was consumed during the mission. Of this total, 184 Ibm was used by the crew and the
Mir during docked operations. Reactants remaining at landing provided a mission
extension capability of 65 hours at an average power level of 16.7 kW. Tanks 4 and 5
were depleted to residual quantities during the mission.
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During the launch countdown on June 27,1995, a small leak of approximately 0.2 Ib/hr
was present from the PRSD subsystem oxygen tank 1. The leak rate decreased
throughout the mission, but the leak had no impact to the planned mission activities.
Postflight troubleshooting isolated the leak to the tank 1 fill quick-disconnect poppet.
The poppet will be replaced.
The PRSD hydrogen manifold 1 valve failed to close when the flight day 1 pre-sleep
cryogenics reconfiguration was performed at 179:00:06 G.m.t. (00:04:34 MET) (Flight
Problem STS-71-V-02). This valve (sin 20) passed the cryogenic screening at NASA
Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) during the Orbiter Maintenance Down Period (OMDP),
and this is the second flight of the valve since OMDP. Following the failure, the oxygen
manifold 1 valve was opened and both manifold 2 valves were closed for the sleep
period. The manifold 1 valves were not used again due to the failure, and the manifold
2 valves were used for all subsequent pre-sleep cryogenic configurations. The
manifold valve 1 failure-to-close was traced during postflight troubleshooting to a
broken ground lug in the valve actuation circuitry. The ground lug will be replaced.
A fault message occurred on PRSD H2 manifold 1 at 182:01:34:25 G.m.t. (03:06:02:06
MET) indicating that the isolation valve was closed when it should be open (Flight
Problem STS-71-V-05). The crew cycled the switch twice without effect. The valve
was verified to be open using tank and manifold pressure data. The indication toggled
several times during the flight. Initial postflight troubleshooting has failed to recreate
the problem.
A high temperature reading in oxygen tank 5 was noted at 188:15:36:32 G.m.t. (Flight
Problem STS-71-V-10). Review of the full-rate data showed three occurrences of the
oxygen tank 5 heater assembly 1 temperature suddenly increasing from 60 °F to
approximately 200 °F, the highest recorded value being 250 °F. This temperature
increase did not correspond to an increase in either of the other two temperature
measurements in the tank, or a pressure increase, or heater-on discretes. The first
occurrence, approximately three minutes prior to landing, set off a master alarm, which
is set off when the temperature measurement reaches 349 °F. The sample rate for the
heater temperature is one sample per second. The caution and warning samples at a
rate of 80 samples per second, and a channel must be out of limits for 0.1 second for
the caution and warning to turn on the master alarm. Consequently, the erratic data
may have been out of limits long enough for the caution and warning to signal the event
but was not out of limits when the data system sampled it. Initial postflight
troubleshooting has failed to recreate the temperature measurement excursions.
Fuel Cell Subsystem
The fuel cell powerplant subsystem performed very satisfactorily throughout the
mission. The fuel cells generated 3,942 kWh of electricity at an average power level of
16.7 kW and load of 549 amperes. In producing this power, the fuel cells used 343 Ibm
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of hydrogen and 2724 Ibm of oxygen, and the fuel cells produced 3,066 Ibm of potable
water.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APU subsystem performed in a nominal manner. The APUs were shut down after
ascent in the manner prescribed by DTO 414 (B) - APU Shutdown Test. A pump load
test was performed after landing with nominal results. The following table presents
APU run-times and fuel consumption during the mission.
APU RUN TIMES AND FUEL CONSUMPTION
Flight phase
Ascent
FCS
checkout
APU 1
Time,
min:sec
20:38
5:29
(SIN 208)
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
52
11
APU 2 (SIN 406)
Time,
min:seo
20:30
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
57
APU 3
Time,
min:sec
20:45
(SIN 310)
85:45
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
56
Entry" 64:56 121 94:57 177 65:00 135
Total =' 91:03 184 115:27 234 191
• The APUs ran for about 20 minutes 48 seconds after landing.
b Mission totals do not include the APU 1, APU 2, and APU 3 confidence-run times or
fuel consumption.
During entry, the APU 3 gearbox pressure transducer became erratic and caused
approximately 80 percent of the GN= supply bottle to be dumped into the gearbox
(Flight Problem STS-71-V-09). The bottle pressure dropped from approximately
180 psia until it became equalized with the gearbox GNz pressure at 35 psia. The lube
oil outlet pressure rose to about 86 psi; however, this pressure did not impact APU
operation. It was subsequently learned that this was the same sensor that was used on
APU 204 on STS-50, which experienced the same event. A normal repressurization
increases gearbox pressure to approximately 10 psi. Extensive testing following
STS-50 did not define a problem with the transducer and it was reinstalled on APU 310.
As a result of this incident, the sensor will be removed and removed and scrapped, and
the oil changed.
The planned hydraulic load test was performed postlanding, and all APU parameters
were nominal
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Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
The hydrauli_water spray boiler (WSB) subsystem performed nominally throughout the
mission with the exception of an overcooling condition and an undercooling condition of
systems 1 and 3, respectively. WSB 1 experienced and overcooling condition shortly
after spray start. The APU lube oil return temperature dropped from a nominal
temperature of 251 °F to 200 °F before returning to a steady-state cooling temperature
of 252.7 °F. WSB 3 experienced an undercooling condition where the APU lube oil
return temperature reached 289 °F prior to spray start. This was followed by an
expected overcooling condition to 229 °F before returning to a steady-state cooling
temperature of 256.7 °F. None of these conditions impacted mission operations.
DTO 414 was performed to investigate an anomalous 40-second hydraulics system 3
supply pressure hang-up observed when APU 3 was shut down early during ascent on
STS-54. The shut-down sequence was APU 2, APU 1, and APU 3, with at least
5 seconds between each system. No back-driving of the power drive unit or anomalous
pressure hang-ups were noted in the data after shutdown of the APUs after ascent.
STS-71 was the first of three flights of OV-104 in which the main case drain
temperature sensors on hydraulic systems 1 and 2 were relocated because of a
concern that the fluid inlet temperature minimum limit of 20 °F at circulation pump start
might be violated. The system 1 temperature sensor was placed near the vehicle
centerline on the 1307 bulkhead, and the system 2 sensor was placed just below the
bulkhead sensor on the system 3 circulation pump inlet line. A bulkhead temperature
of 1 °F was the coldest temperature recorded, while the corresponding temperature for
circulation pump 3 was 38 °F. During most of the mission, circulation pump 3 inlet line
temperature was considerably warmer than the bulkhead and well above the minimum
requirement of 20 °F. Additionally, all three circulation pump body temperatures were
above 50 °F. This flight data revealed that the fluid inlet temperatures for circulation
pump 3 and probably circulation pumps 1 and 2 were always above the 20 °F
requirement.
WSB performance during entry was nominal with WSB 3 being operated on the B
controller. WSB 3 experienced three occurrences of overcooling and one minor
undercool occurrence. The lube oil return temperature reached 273 °F prior to spray
start. This was then followed by an overcooling condition in which the lube oil return
temperature reached 236 °F. Approximately three minutes later, another overcooling
condition was observed when the steady-state cooling temperature dropped from
252 °F to 236 °F. Twenty minutes later, the third and final overcooling condition
occurred when the temperature went down to 207 °F. None of these occurrences
impacted entry operations.
The hydraulic loads test was performed after landing using hydraulic systems 1 and 3.
Both systems operated properly.
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Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed satisfactorily
during all mission phases with no anomalies or problems noted in the data.
Environmental Control and Life Support System
The active thermal control system (ATCS) performed satisfactorily throughout the
mission. The ATCS successfully supported payload cooling requirements with the
Freon coolant loop (FCL) 2 flow proportioning valve in the payload position. This was
performed at 179:12:01 G.m.t. (00:16:29 MET) for an initial Spacelab activation prior to
docking with the Mir. The flow proportioning module was returned to the interchanger
position to support vehicle cooling needs during the Mir rendezvous and docking
procedures. Payload cooling was reinitialized by placing the FCL2 flow proportioning
valve in payload position at 180:17:29 G.m.t. (01:21:57 MET), where it remained for the
duration of on-orbit operations. The loop was returned to the interchanger position at
188:08:06 G.m.t. (09:12:34 MET) for entry as a part of the final Spacelab Pallet
deactivation procedures.
The radiator coldsoak provided cooling during entry through touchdown-plus-5-minutes
when ammonia boiler system (ABS) A was activated using the primary/GPC controller.
To minimize thermal stress on the long-duration Mir crew, ammonia cooling was
activated early by selecting the high outlet temperature set-point (57 °F) on both FCL
radiator flow controllers when the radiator controller outlet temperature exceeded
40 °F. This provided the necessary heat load for the ABS and avoided the increased
cabin temperature transient which occurs during nominal postlanding operations
between coldsoak depletion and ammonia activation. System A operated for
35 minutes until the ammonia was depleted. System B was activated postlanding at
188:15:34 G.m.t., using the secondary controller, and operated for 25 minutes before
ground cooling was initiated.
The supply water and waste management systems performed normally throughout the
mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the flash evaporator system
(FES) and water transfer to the Mir. Three CWCs and 18 Russian EDV water tanks
were filled with potable water, thus providing the Mir Space Station with 1,067 Ibm of
water. The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between 69 and 93 °F
throughout the mission using the line heater.
Waste water was gathered at the predicted rate. Three waste water dumps were
performed at an average rate of 1.96 percent/minute (3.25 Ibrrdmin). The waste water
dump line temperature was maintained between 55 and 73 °F throughout the mission.
The vacuum vent line temperature was between 58 and 76 °F, and the vacuum vent
nozzle was between 120 and 180 °F.
The waste collection system performed normally throughout the mission.
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The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) performed nominally throughout the
mission. Air temperature control of the ODS was maintained within limits and above
the dew-point temperature. The center-line camera hatch window was maintained free
of condensation with the air flow duct. Since Spacelab coolant requirements were low,
one Freon coolant loop was retained in the interchanger position, and this controlled
the Orbiter dew-point to a lower level (50 vs. 55 °F) and provided satisfactory humidity
control to the Mir. Orbiter and Spacelab carbon dioxide (C02) control maintained the
Orbiter and Mir CO2 levels within the agreed limits. Air flow to the Mir provided
sufficient thermal conditioning when more than three crewmen were in the Mir.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) performed
satisfactorily throughout the flight. After docking with the Mir Space Station, the
vestibule was pressurized using Mir consumables. Subsequently, the upper hatch
equalization valves of the Orbiter airlock were opened, and the Mir and Orbiter volumes
were equalized to a total pressure of 13.20 psia. Prior to opening these valves, the
Orbiter and ODS pressure was 14.68 psia. Following opening of the Orbiter-to-Mir
transfer hatches, the entire Mir/Orbiter volume was pressurized up to 14.62 psia using
the Orbiter ARPCS. Prior to undocking, the entire Mir/Orbiter volume was further
pressurized to 15.1 psia. Total consumables transferred to the Mir was 87.4 Ib of
nitrogen and 48.3 Ib of oxygen. The nitrogen was used for Mir pressurization, and the
oxygen was used for additional crew metabolic consumption during the docked
operations and for raising the Mir partial pressure of oxygen before undocking.
Vestibule depressurization during the undocking required 1.5 hours as opposed to the
planned 5 minutes. At 184:19:59 G.m.t. (06:00:27 MET), the vestibule depressurization
began. Low flow was observed when the primary depressurization valves were opened
(Flight Problem STS-71-V-06). After the low flow was noted, the secondary
depressurization valves were also opened, but no change in flow rate occurred. The
slow vestibule depressurization appeared to be due to a thermal insulation blanket
blocking the depressurization valve port. in reviewing the drawings, no hole in the
blanket was called out at the location of the valve port. The port is 1.5-inches in
diameter with a debris screen across it. When the pressure in the vestibule reached
about 1.9 psia, the valves were closed and the hatch leak Check was successfully
performed. The valves were then reopened at 184:22:38 G.m.t. (06:03:06 MET),
remained open overnight, and the vestibule vented completely. Modifications are being
made to remove the portion of the thermal blanket that covers the depressurization
valve port for future ODS missions.
Airlock Support System
Use of the airlock depressurization valve was not required as no extravehicular activity
(EVA) was planned or performed. However, after docking with the Mir, the external
airlock-to-vestibule hatch equalization valve was used to equalize the Mir and Orbiter
habitable volume pressures. The active system monitor parameters indicated normal
output throughout the duration of the flight.
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Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression System
The smoke detection and fire suppression system showed no indications of smoke
generation during the flight. Use of the fire suppression system was not required.
Avionics and Software Systems
The ascent and entry guidance, navigation and control subsystem performance was
nominal with the day of launch I loads updates (DOLILU) being used for ascent.
Flight control system performance was nominal. All on-orbit flight control mission
objectives were accomplished including post-docking control, mated control, and
residual rate control. Indications from the Russian counterparts are that the Mir control
performance was also nominal.
The forward RCS was using more propellant than predicted while in the inertial-hold
attitude and docked with the Mir. As a result, a change to a gravity-gradient attitude
was made that resulted in a large reduction in propellant consumption. The increased
propellant usage in the inertial-hold attitude only occurred during negative pitch
maneuvers. Analysis showed that this phenomenon was caused by the effects of R5D
and L5D RCS thruster-plume impingement upon the elevons and body flap. The effect
of this phenomenon is virtually undetectable in the Orbiter-only configuration; however,
it is believed to be magnified in the Shuttle-Mir docked configuration because the
center-of-gravity (c.g.) is external to the vehicle. These results demonstrated that the
Orbiter vernier RCS can successfully control the mated Shuttle/Mir configurations.
The Mir assumed the attitude control function for the combined vehicles at
183:10:13 G.m.t. (04:14:41 MET). Mir control was monitored,via the Shuttle DAP
estimator. Mir appeared to require gyrodyne desaturation twice as often as shown in
preflight estimates, but overall Mir control was satisfactory. The Orbiter resumed
attitude control at 183:14:55 G.m.t. (04:19:23 MET). The Orbiter elevons were parked
at -7.5 ° to aid in the investigation of the higher-than-predicted propellant usage during
Orbiter-controlled inertial attitudes.
The inertial measurement units (IMUs) performed satisfactorily with only one
accelerometer compensation required to be uplinked. Drift of the units remained at
one sigma (0.006 deg/hr) or better throughout the mission. No adjustment of gyro
compensations was required. During the mission, accelerometer compensations were
uplinked once. The uplink was performed about 13 hours after launch. As expected,
the largest compensation was 98 I_g for the IMU sin 203 Z-axis, and this is typical for
this particular unit.
Star tracker performance was also satisfactory with no problems noted.
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The data processing system (DPS) hardware and software performed nominally;
however, some operations problems were noted. These are discussed in the following
three paragraphs.
At 181:05:08:59 G.m.t. (02:09:36:40 MET), GPC 4 (sin 536), which had been
functioning as the SM machine, failed to sync with GPC 1 and was declared failed by
GPC 1. The crew brought up GPC 3 as the SM machine. A hardware/software dump
analysis of the GPC 4 fail-to-sync was completed. Data showed that a dropped bit
(change from '0111' to '0011') occurred in the hardware data flow when the data sector
extension (DSE) register contents were stored in the SVC OLD PSW memory location.
This erroneous value caused flight software to branch into the middle of a flight
computer operating system (FCOS) routine without a correct pointer back to the calling
routine. The analysis confirms that the fail-to-sync was most likely the result of a
hardware event that was probably caused by a radiation upset. An initial program load
(IPL) was performed on GPC 4 and placed in the common set in OPS 0 for one hour
for driving CRT 2 and no anomalies were noted. GPC 4 was then brought into the G2
redundant set with no strings assigned and subsequently freeze-dried for the crew
sleep period. During the following flight day, GPC 4 was reassigned as the SM
machine. GPC 4 operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission.
At 182:08:50:30 G.m.t. (03:13:18:11 MET), a CRT 2 BITE message was annunciated
against DEU 2. This error was attributed to a known "short store complete" scenario,
which can occur on -0108 or -0109 DEUs (DEU 2 sin 29 is a -0108). Crew procedures
corrected the BITE condition.
The SM checkpoint at 182:09:10:36 G.m.t. (03:13:38:17 MET) failed with a "checkpoint
fail" and an "off/busy" message annunicated against MMU 1. The SM checkpoint was
reattempted successfully on MMU 1, and the MMU operated satisfactorily for the
remainder of the flight. The signature observed is consistent with a known MMU power
supply problem caused by internal noise.
The displays and controls operated nominally; however, a master alarm occurred
during the final approach to landing with no associated fault message. The indications
are that the alarm was caused by the PRSD 02 tank 5 heater assembly temperature
excursions.
Communications and Tracking Subsystems
The communications and tracking subsystems performed nominally. Satisfactory
communications were maintained throughout the mission with only one anomaly noted.
Beginning at 187:15:33 G.m.t. (08:20:01 MET), the S-band system experienced
dropouts and loss of frame synchronization intermittently over the next six hours while
operating on the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) with a number of sites
(Flight Problem STS-71-V-08). Tests were performed at 188:03:42 G.m.t.
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(09:08:09 MET) with frame synchronization remaining satisfactory while operating on
transponder 1. However, upon transition to transponder 2, the frame synchronization
locked and unlocked continuously. This condition resulted in the Mission Control
Center experiencing problems commanding the Orbiter. Communications were
restored by stored program command (SPC) at the tracking and data relay satellite
(TDRS) West acquisition when transponder 1 was reselected. This configuration was
used satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission.
The S-band forward link dropouts were experienced during parts of TDRS-East passes
on revolutions 31, 32, and 34 while transmitting on the lower right antenna. The
interference with Mir frequencies and physical blockage have been ruled out because
the problem did not occur on another antenna. Data evaluation did not show the cause
of the poor communications. After revolution 34, the antenna provided satisfactory
communications for the remainder of the mission.
Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitor 2 began flickering and went blank after being
powered up following a one-hour down period. The unit was powered down and the
filter was cleaned. Performance of the monitor was nominal for the remainder of the
mission.
Operational Instrumentation/Modular Auxiliary Data System
The operational instrumentation and MADS performed nominally throughout the
mission. However, the MADS recorder could not be ground-commanded on for entry.
This condition resulted from the onboard panel switch being in the center neutral
(non-functional) position, which prevented uplink command control.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed satisfactorily throughout the
mission with no anomalies noted. The postflight inspection revealed that the tires and
brakes were in good condition, and the landing and braking data are shown in the table
on the following page.
The drag chute performance was nominal.
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited moderate hazing, and a light haze was present on
the remaining windows. Tile damage on the window perimeter tiles was significantly
less than usual, and the four damage sites in the perimeter tile above window 3 were
not caused by debris impact.
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Landing and Braking Parameters
Parameter
Main gear touchdown
Nose gear touchdown
From
threshold,
ft
Speed,
keas
Sink rate, ft/sec
2324 200.6 ~ 2.0
5474 159.6 N/A "5.2
Pitch rate,
deg/sec
N/A
Brake initiation speed
Brake-on time
Rollout distance
Rollout time
Runway
Orbiter weight at landing
Peak
Brake sensor
location
Left-hand inboard i
Left-hand inboard 3
Left-hand outboard 2
Left-hand outboard 4
Right-hand inboard 1
Right-hand inboard 3
Right-hand outboard 2
Right-hand outboard 4
pressure,
psia
864
8O4
828
756
852
852
792
744
148.3 keas
40.0 seconds
8,353 feet
53.8 seconds
15 (Concrete) KSC SLF
216,371 Ib
Brake assembly
Left-hand outboard
Left-hand inboard
Energy,
million ft-lb
16.77
19.62
Right-hand inboard 24.18
Right-hand outboard 23.09
Integrated Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal Interfaces
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal with no problems, anomalies or
unexpected conditions identified in the data.
The integrated heating during ascent and entry was nominal, based on the data and
plume appearance. The entry aerodynamic heating was also nominal; however,
posfflight analysis and heating calculations are continuing as this report is being
written.
The performance of the thermal interfaces was nominal with all temperatures remaining
within limits.
Thermal Control System
The thermal control system performance was nominal throughout the mission with all
temperatures being maintained within allowable limits.
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Thermal data were successfully collected for DTO 1122 -APAS Thermal Data, and
these data will be used in the thermal math model correlation.
Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating during entry was nominal. The structural temperatures were near
the limits, and the structural temperature rises were within the experience data base.
The structural temperature rise on the left and right wings was symmetrical and within
the experience data base.
Local heating was nominal; however, analysis is continuing based on data from the
postflight thermal protection system (TPS) inspection. The loss of MADS recorder data
during entry will prevent any analysis based on that data. The Operational
Instrumentation/Modified Auxiliary Data System section of this report discusses the loss
of the MADS data.
Thermal Protection Subsystem and Windows
The TPS performed satisfactorily. Based on structural temperature response data
(temperature rise), the entry heating was above average. Many of the measured
structural temperature rises were above previous maximums for OV-104, but were
within the experience base of the Orbiter fleet. Data to determine boundary layer
transition time from laminar to turbulent flow is not available for this mission as the
MADS recorder was not operational during entry.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 164 hits, of which 25 had a major dimension of
one-inch or larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat
shield attributed to the flame arrestment sparkler system. A comparison of these
numbers to previous missions indicates both the total number of hits and the number of
hits one-inch or larger was above average.
Data show that the lower surface sustained a total of 149 hits of which 24 had a major
dimension of one-inch or larger, and that is 10 more hits than average. Most of the tile
debris damage sites were located to the right of the centerline, and none of the hits on
the lower surface were unusually large or unique in nature. Most of the hits showed
signs of thermal erosion, typical of entry heating. The upper surface had 10 hits, of
which one had a major dimension of one-inch or larger. The right OMS pod had two
hits and the left OMS pod had three hits.
The tile damage sites aft of the LH= and LO= ETIOrbiter umbilicals are believed to be
caused by impacts from umbilical ice, and were typical in number and size. No tile
damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris has been identified.
The ET/Orbiter separation devices functioned nominally. All separation ordnance
retention shutters were closed properly. Umbilical cioseout foam about 6 inches long
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and less than one inch wide, along with a one-inch long piece of the white RTV dam,
had adhered to the umbilical plate near the LH2 recirculation line disconnect. No debris
was found on the runway below the umbilicals.
Two tiles on the nose landing gear door (NLGD) were identified as scrap due to edge-
lip damage. All of the NLGD thermal barriers (T/Bs) were in good condition except for
one breached TIB. One left-hand and two right-hand main landing gear door (MLGD)
T/Bs were breached, with two being identified as probable scraps. No damage was
noted on the MLGD tiles.
The ET door T/Bs and tile condition was nominal. Most of the ET door T/Bs had flown
three flights and have performed well. A loose carrier panel on the leading edge of the
right-hand inboard elevon, near the center hinge, was found; however, no thermal
damage occurred as a result of this condition. Some thermal damage occurred at the
left-hand inboard elevon center hinge area (charred polyimide seal, carrier panel
discoloration, glazed/slumped tile, and charred filler bar). Slumped tiles were noted in
this same area on the previous flight of this vehicle.
The engine dome-mounted heatshield blankets were in good condition, with only minor
fraying observed on SSME 2 at the 12 o'clock position. Base heatshield tile peppering
was less than usual. One tile near the lower right-hand comer of the drag chute
opening was damaged due to the drag chute deployment. One of the "piano hinge
tiles" located on the upper body flap stub near the SSME 3 5 o'clock position was
broken. Similar damage has occurred to these tiles on previous flights of this vehicle.
No ice adhered to the payload bay door; however, a white residue was present around
the waste water dump nozzle. Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical. All
three dome mounted heat shield closeout blankets were in excellent condition.
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FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
The performance of the flight crew equipment/Government furnished equipment was
nominal. The recumbent seat system, flown for the first time, performed nominally.
Seven anomalies were noted in this area and they are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
The crew reported at approximately 187:03:57 G.m.t. (08:08:25 MET) that the
Hasselblad 70mm camera (SIN 1026) shutter-release button was sticking (Flight
Problem STS-71-F-05). When the shutter release button was depressed, the camera
cycled through the remainder of the film magazine; however, the camera shutter did not
open and the film was not exposed. An in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure was
performed in which the shutter release button was moved from the primary receptacle
to the secondary receptacle. The IFM was successful and the camera performed
nominally for the remainder of the mission. The crew also stated that the lens had
jammed, but they were able to restore proper operation of the lens. Another
Hasselblad 70mm camera was available if the one in use had become inoperable.
The very lightweight head set (VLHS) cable could not be found during the flight (Flight
Problem STS-71-F-04). The lack of this cable resulted from the fact that the paperwork
could not be completed in the time required to manifest the cable for stowage.
The environmental control and life support subsystem (ECLSS) booster fan dessicant
bags were missing from locker MA9N (Flight Problem STS-71-F-03). The bags could
not be located onboard the vehicle. Operations were conducted without the dessicant
bags. No ODS overhead hatch window fogging was reported. A review of the preflight
paperwork shows that the bags should have been onboard.
During power-up for the checkout of the rendezvous equipment, the LIDAR battery
packs were providing zero voltage to the LIDAR. All battery packs were opened and it
was discovered that no batteries had been installed (Flight Problem STS-71-V-01).
Since the LIDAR was a necessary piece of equipment for the rendezvous operations,
an IFM was developed to provide the Orbiter 28 Vdc to 10.5 VDC via the IFM breakout
box. The IFM was successful and the LIDAR was used for the rendezvous operations.
An investigation of the anomaly revealed that the personal illness of the individual who
normally packs the batteries resulted in the battery installation being overlooked.
Measures have been taken to ensure that this incident will not recur.
During three SAREX passes, the ground radio operators reported that the signal carrier
was good but the audio level from the crew was very low (Flight Problem STS-71-F-06).
During these passes, the crew was using the VHF communication system with the VHF
transceiver_s handset in the high-power mode. The crew reconfigured the VHF to the
audio distribution system radio interface unit (ARIU) and a lightweight headset, and the
radio operators reported good audio in the new configuration.
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Also during SAREX operations, the crew attempted to used the VHF radio and ARIU in
a dual headset mode so that two crewmembers could participate in the communication
event. However, the crewmember connected to the ARIU could transmit and the
second crewmember who was connected to the Commander's audio terminal unit
(ATU) could not (Flight Problem STS-71-F-07). Troubleshooting revealed that the
same problem existed in other transmit modes, and postflight testing and
troubleshooting will be required to resolve this condition.
At 182:13:17 G.m.t. (03:17:45 MET), the crew reported that the primary air-to-air VHF
radio would not transmit; however, the receive function still operated (Flight Problem
STS-71-F-02). A power cycle of the radio was performed, but the radio transmit
function remained inoperative. The crew reported and error message that indicated a
failed power amplifier, which would result in the loss of the transmit capability. The
backup VHF radio was used successfully for the remainder of activities. Postflight
repair is planned.
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CARGO INTEGRATION
Integration hardware performance was nominal throughout the mission, with one
anomaly identified. At 185:15:50 G.m.t. (06:20:18 MET), the crew was unsuccessful in
downlinking photographic images using the Ku-band communications adapter (KCA)
through outlet 2 on the payload data interface panel (PDIP) in the Orbiter aft flight
deck. Power had been lost to the outlet because of a open fuse, and satisfactory
operation was regained through an IFM procedure.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVE/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
A total of 11 development test objectives (DTOs) and seven detailed supplementary
objectives (DSOs) was defined for the STS-71 mission. The preliminary results of the
DTOs and DSOs are discussed in the following paragraphs.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 301 D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - This DTO was performed during
the ascent phase of the mission and is a data-only DTO. The data were dumped
postflight and given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published in
separate documentation.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - This DTO was to be performed during the
entry phase of the mission and is a data-only DTO. However, the MADS recorder
could not be activated and no entry data were collected.
DTO 312 - External Tank Thermal Protection System Performance - The crew cabin
photographs of the ET after separation were not taken on the STS-71 mission because
the normal pitch maneuver that is required was not performed because of propellant
limitations. The accomplishment of this DTO was based on the umbilical well
photography.
Three rolls of umbilical well camera film were evaluated for this DTO. The evaluation
of these films revealed no observations of anomalous performance.
DTO 414 - APU Shutdown Test - The APUs were shut down in the order specified.
Data evaluation showed no evidence of power drive unit (PDU) back-driving. The
sponsor will publish the results of this DTO in a separate document.
DTO 624 - Radiator Performance - This DTO of opportunity was not performed as the
radiators were not deployed during this flight.
DTO 656 - PGSC Single Event Upset Monitoring Configuration - Data were collected
for this DTO, and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The
results of the evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 684 - Radiation Measurements in Shuttle Crew Compartment - The equipment for
this DTO was deployed at 179:14:53 G.m.t. (00:20:11 MET) and data were collected for
this DTO. The data were given to the sponsor for analysis, and the results of that
analysis will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 700-10 - Orbiter Space Vision System Flight Video Taping - Video taping using
the Orbiter Space Vision System (OSVS) was very successful. The downlink showed
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views of the OSVS targets on the ODS from cameras A and D. The variety of Orbiter
attitudes provided many different lighting and shadowing conditions. Additionally,
views were recorded showing the activation of the forward bulkhead lights and the mag
lights during night passes. The artificial lighting proved acceptable for tracking the
ODS targets from both cameras. Alternating zoomed-in views from cameras A and D
during day and night passes were used during postflight evaluations for simultaneous
two-camera studies. The results of the analysis will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO of opportunity was not
performed because conditions were not appropriate for data collection.
DTO 832 - Target of Opportunity Navigation Sensors - The crew completed target-of-
opportunity navigation sensors (TONS) activities during the rendezvous/docking and
the undocking/separation phases of the mission. Data have been given to the sponsor
for analysis, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 1118 - Photographic and Video Survey of Mir Space Station - The crew performed
the photographic surveys of the Mir Space Station as well as selected Public Affairs
activities using the onboard video systems, the Electronic Still Camera-II (ESC-II), and
normal photographic equipment. Some of the video and ESC-II pictures were
downlinked for evaluation during the flight. Additional evaluation was performed
posfflight when all the video and film were available. A PDIP power failure interrupted
the downlink of ESC-II pictures until an IFM procedure was performed. The delayed
downlink did not significantly affect DTO activities.
DTO 1120 - Mated Shuttle and Mir Free Drift Experiment - The test for this DTO was
successfully performed at 184:09:45 G.m.t. (05:13:45 MET) in the 2-degree biased GO
1.2 attitude versus the non-biased GO 1.2 attitude that was planned during preflight
activities to be used. The mated stack showed good stability during the test with very
few thruster firings. A drift in the yaw axis was observed that had not been seen in the
preflight predictions. This drift was most likely caused by the flight configuration of the
Mir solar arrays, which were in a non-symmetric configuration. Data have been given
to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in
separate documentation.
DTO 1122 - APAS Thermal Data - The APAS thermal data were collected to validate
the thermal models. All docking mechanism temperatures remained within expected
ranges.
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DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers - Data were collected for this
DSO, and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 608 - Effects of Spaceflight on Aerobic and Anaerobic Metabolism During
Exercise - Data were collected for this DSO, and these data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DSO 624 - Pre and Postflight Measurement of Cardiorespiratory Responses to
Submaximal Exercise - Data were collected for this DSO, and these data have been
given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in
separate documentation.
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - Data were collected for this DSO, and these data
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be
reported in separate documentation.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Data were collected for this
DSO, and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - Data were collected for this DSO, and
these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation
will be reported in separate documentation.
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
A total of 24 videos of launch and 52 films of launch were reviewed and analyzed. One
camera did not operate during the launch operations. No potential anomalies were
noted in any of the videos or films.
DTO 312 photography was not taken from the flight deck; however, three rolls of film
were exposed from the umbilical wells. This DTO is discussed in a previous section of
this report.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
DTO 1118 - Photographic and Video Survey of Mir Space Station - Photographic and
video documentation of the Mir Space Station were collected. A ground-controlled
survey of the Mir's exterior surfaces was accomplished during the first two sleep
periods of the docked phase. Detailed views of the Orbiter-facing side of the Kvant-2
and Spektr modules were acquired. Film and video of the Mir exterior surfaces will
require analysis through the end of August 1995. The results of the analysis will be
reported in separate documentation.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
Twelve videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were reviewed and no anomalies
were noted in the review.
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TABLE I.- STS-71 MISSION EVENTS
Event Description Actual time, G.m.t.
APU Activation
SRB HPU Activation =
Main Propulsion System
Start=
SRB Ignition Command
(Li_off_
Throttle up to 104 Percent
Thrust=
Throttle down to
68 Percent Thrust =
Throttle up to 104 Percent =
Maximum Dynamic Pressure
(q)
Both SRM's Chamber
Pressure at 50 psi =
End SRM =Actiona
SRB Physical Separation =
SRB Separation Command
39 Acceleration
Throttle Down for
39 Acceleration =
Throttle Down to
68 Percent Thrust"
SSME Shutdowna
MECO
ET Separation
=MSFC supplied data
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LH HPU System A start command
LH HPU System B start command
RH HPU System A start command
RH HPU System B start command
ME-3 Start command accepted
ME-2 Start command accepted
ME-1 Start command accepted
Calculated SRB ignition command
ME-3 Command accepted
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-2 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-2 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-2 Command accepted
Derived ascent dynamic pressure
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
RH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
SRB separation command flag
Total load factor
ME-3 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-2 comman d accepted
ME-3 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
ME-3 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
MECO command flag
MECO confirm flag
ET separation command flag
178:19:27:32.192
178:19:27:33.538
178:19:27:34.790
178:19:31:51.278
178:19:31:51.278
178:19:31.51.438
178:19:31:51.438
178:19:32:12.429
178:19:32:12.566
178:19:32:12.682
178:19:32:18.988
178:19:32:23.829
178:19:32:23.843
178:19:32:23.847
178:19:32:47.948
178:19:32:47.963
178:19:32:47.967
178:19:33:13.707
178:19:33:13.724
178:19:33:13.728
178:19:33:22.712
178:19:34:17.668
178:19:34:18.028
178:19:34:19.338
178:19:34:20.098
178:19:34:22.548
178:19:34:22.548
178:19:34:23
178:19:39:47
178:19:39:47.293
178:19:39:47.295
178:19:39:47.335
178:19:40:43.293
178:19:40:43.295
178:19:40:43.636
178:19:40:49.493
178:19:40:49.495
178:19:40:49.536
178:19:40:50
178:19:40:50
178:19:41:09.33
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Event
APU Deactivation
OMS-1 Ignition
TABLE I.- STS-71 MISSION EVENTS
(Continued)
Description Actual time, G.m.L
178:19:48:04.044
178:19:48:10.200
178:18:48:19.699
OMS-1 Cutoff
OMS-2 Ignition
OMS-2 Cutoff
Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs)
Open
OMS-3 Ignition
OMS-3 Cutoff
OMS-4 Ignition
OMS-4 Cutoff
OMS-5 Ignition
OMS-5 Cutoff
OMS-6 Ignition
OMS-6 Cutoff
Mir/Shuttle Capture
Docking Completed
Undocking Completed
Flight Control System
Checkout
APU Start
APU Stop
Payload Bay Doors Close
APU Activation for Entry
Deorbit Bum Ignition
Deorbit Bum Cutoff
Entry Interface (400K feet)
Blackout end
Terminal Area Energy Mgmt.
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU 1 GG chamber pressure
APU 3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine hi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine hi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine hi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve Position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve Position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
capture
Docking ring final Position
Undocldng completed
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
PLBD left close 1
PLBD dght close 1
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine hi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Left engine hi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Current orbital altitude above
Data locked (high sample rate)
Major mode change (305)
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
178:20:15:16.6
178:20:15:16.8
178:20:16:04.4
178:20:16:04.5
176:21:05:57
178:21:07:15
176:23:10:25.2
178:23:10:25.2
178:23:12:42.1
176:23:12:42.1
179:10:49:35.8
N/A
179:10:49:48.2
N/A
180:07:57:17.2
180:07:57:17.2
180:07:58:03.2
180:07:58:03.2
180:09:31:01.2
N/A
180:09:31:10.4
N/A
180:13:00:13.9
180:13:08:17.9
185:11:09:41.8
167:10:27:32.280
187:10:33:00.990
186:11:04:26
188:11:06:03
188:13:40:25.404
188:14:10:23.720
188:14:10:25.588
188:13:45:19.3
188:13:45:19.3
186:13:48:52.6
188:13:48:52.7
188:14:23:09
No blackout
188:14:48:13
52
Event
Main Landing Gear
Contact
Main Landing Gear
Weight on Wheels
Drag Chute Deployment
Nose Landing Gear
Contact
Nose Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Jettison
Wheel Stop
APU Deactivation
TABLE I.- STS-71 MISSION EVENTS
(Continued)
Description
LH main landing gear tire pressure 1
RH main landing gear tire pressure 2
RH main landing gear weight on wheels
LH main landing gear weight on wheels
Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts
NLG LH tire pressure 1
NLG weight on wheels 1
Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts
Velocity with respect to runway
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Actual time,
G.m.t.
188:14:54:35
188:14:54:35
188:14:54:36
188:14:54:38
188:14:54:38.8
188:14:54:44
188:14:54:45
188:14:55:09.2
188:14:55:28
188:15:15:20.110
188:15:15:22.686
188:15:15:25.518
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DOCUMENTSOURCES
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data for
this mission report, the following list is provided.
1. Flight Requirements Document
2. Public Affairs Press Kit
3. Customer Support Room Daily Reports
4. MER Daily Reports
5. MER Mission Summary Report
6. MER Quick Look Report
7. MER Problem Tracking List
8. MER Event Times
9. Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs
10. MOD Systems Anomaly List
11. MSFC Flash Report
12. MSFC Event Times
13. MSFC Interim Report
14. Crew Debriefing comments
15. Shuttle Operational Data Book
A-1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items
are used in this document.
ABS
APAS
APDS
APU
ARIU
ARPCS
ARS
ASTP
ATCS
ATU
BITE
CCTV
CCVA
c.g.
COMSEC
CO2
CRT
CWC
DAP
DEU
DOLILU
DPS
DSO
DTO
AV
EDV
EPDC
ESC-II
ET
EVA
FCE
FCL
FCOS
FCS
FCV
FES
ft/sec
GFE
GH2
G.m.t.
GN=
GO
GPC
ammonia boiler system
Androgynous Peripheral Assembly System
Androgynous Peripheral Docking System
auxiliary power unit
audio distribution system radio interface unit
atmospheric revitalization pressure control system
atmospheric revitalization system
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
active thermal control system
audio terminal unit
built-in test equipment
closed circuit television
chamber coolant valve actuator
center of gravity
communications security
carbon dioxide
cathode ray tube
contingency water carder
digital autopilot
display electronics unit
day of launch I loads
data processing system
Detailed Supplementary Objective
Developmental Test Objective
differential velocity
Russian water bottle
electrical power distribution and control subsystem
electronic still camera-II
External Tank
extravehicular activity
flight crew equipment
Freon coolant loop
flight control operating system
flight control system
flow control valve
flash evaporator system
feet per second
Government furnished equipment
gaseous hydrogen
Greenwich mean time
gaseous nitrogen
gravity orientation
general purpose computer
B-1
HAINS
HPFTP
HPOTP
IFM
IMAX
IMU
IO
Isp
ISS
KSC
kW
kWh
LCC
LESC
LH2
LIDAR
LO2
MADS
MCC
MECO
MET
Mir
MLGD
MMU
MPLM
MPS
MSFC
NASA
NLGD
nmi.
NPS
NSLD
NSTS
02
OMRSD
OMS
OPOV
OSVS
PAL
Pc
PCT
PDIP
PDU
PMBT
ppm
PRSD
RCS
RM
RME
high accuracy inertial navigation system
high pressure fuel turbopump
high pressure oxidizer turbopump
in-flight maintenance
Canadian camera system
inertial measurement unit
inertial orientation
specific impulse
International Space Station
Kennedy Space Center
kilowatt
kilowatt hour
Launch Commit Cdteria
Lockheed Engineering and Science Company
liquid hydrogen
light distance and ranging
liquid oxygen
modular auxiliary data system
main combustion chamber
main engine cutoff
mission elapsed time
Russian Space Station
main landing gear door
mass memory storage unit
mini-pressurized logistics module
main propulsion system
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nose landing gear door
nautical mile
net positive suction pressure
NASA Shuffle Logistics Depot
National Space Transportation System (i.e., Space Shuffle Program)
oxygen
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
orbital maneuvering subsystem
oxidizer preburner oxidizer valve
Orbiter Space Vision System
protuberance air load
chamber pressure
postcontact thrusting
payload data interface panel
power drive unit
propellant mean bulk temperature
parts per million
power reactant storage and distribution
reaction control subsystem
redundancy management
radiation monitoring equipment
B-2
RSRM
RTV
RVDT
S&A
SAMS
SAREX-II
SLF
SM
s/n
SPC
SRB
SRSS
SSME
STDN
TB
TCS
TDRS
TI
TONS
TORU
TPS
TV
UHF
Vdc
VHF
VLHS
WSB
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
room temperature vulcanizing
rotary variable differential transformer
safe and arm
Shuttle Acceleration Monitoring System
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II
Shuttle Landing Facility
system management
serial number
stored program command
Solid Rocket Booster
Shuttle range safety system
Space Shuttle main engine
Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
thermal barriers
thermal control system
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
terminal phase initiation
Target Opportunity Navigation Sensors
Russian tele-operated docking system
thermal protection subsystem
television
ultrahigh frequency
Volts, direct current
very high frequency
very lightweight head set
water spray boiler
B-3
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